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THE CLEAN AIR ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1990:




The Clean Air Act (the Act)' embodies both a goal and a challenge:
achieving the ideal of clean air while maintaining the benefits of life in a
modem industrial economy. Congress recognized that the reconciliation
of these often conflicting desires requires resources, time and institutional
commitment. Having codified this dual objective, Congress entrusted the
mandate of the Act to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).2
As enacted in 1970, the Act empowered citizens to enforce its provi-
sions by bringing suit in federal court if and when the EPA procras-
tinated or defaulted in prosecuting violations. Where grounds for suit
existed, citizen plaintiffs would be in a position to compel the EPA to
more vigorously enforce the anti-pollution standards. In cases where the
EPA remained sluggish, the citizen suit was available as an alternate en-
forcement mechanism. 3
Although Congress envisioned citizens supervising the EPA's progress
toward meeting the Act's objectives,4 the citizen suit provisions in the
1970 Clean Air Act legislation5 merely set forth specific rights of action.
The limited character of these rights would later provoke congressional
review and change.6
The Act provides citizens with three principal means of enforcement.
First, citizens are entitled to file suit to force a party into compliance
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1. Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1706 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857-1858(a) (1970)).
2. Maine v. Thomas, 874 F.2d 883, 884 (1st Cir. 1989).
3. See Baughman v. Bradford Coal Co., 592 F.2d 215, 218 (3d Cir. 1979) (the legis-
lative history of the citizen suit provisions of the Clean Air Act show congressional intent
for citizens to supervise EPA enforcement), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 961 (1979). See gener-
ally Nauen, Citizen Environmental Lawsuits After Gwaltney: The Thrill of Victory or the
Agony of Defeat?, 15 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 327 (1989) (citizen's suits provisions of the
Clean Air Act are the progenitor of all environmental citizen actions and were designed
to help achieve the goals of the Act).
4. See Gardeski v. Colonial Sand & Stone Co., 501 F. Supp. 1159, 1162 (S.D.N.Y.
1980).
5. See 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a) (1988); see generally Clean Air Amendments of 1970,
Pub. L. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1706 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857-1858(a) (1970)).
6. Cf. Maine v. Thomas, 874 F.2d at 884-85 (lack of clarity in jurisdictional provi-
sions of citizen suits under the Clean Air Act created confusion among the courts and
potential plaintiffs).
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with national emissions standards if the EPA Administrator has failed to
prosecute the violator.7 Second, citizen enforcement may compel the
Administrator to perform a nondiscretionary duty.' Third, a related
provision allows a right of review of final Agency action9 by petition to
the United States Court of Appeals for the appropriate circuit.' ° Con-
gress amended the Act in 1977 to include a citizen right of action" to
restrain construction or operation of a new or modified major emitting
facility without a permit.' 2
Shortcomings of the Act, as amended in 1977, became apparent in its
practical application. One problem was the requirement that the defend-
ant be in actual violation of an emission standard before the case could be
considered ripe. This requirement made all citizen actions for past viola-
tions moot, no matter how serious the infraction. Another drawback was
the limited set of remedies available to citizen plaintiffs. The Act, as in
force through mid-1990, allowed only injunctive relief; money damages
were never granted.13
The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 (1990 Amendments)' 4 are
designed to address structural deficiencies in the existing clean air pro-
grams and to solve air pollution control problems that have arisen since
the 1977 revisions. The citizen suit provisions in the 1990 Amendments
retain all the benefits of the earlier statute, such as relaxed jurisdiction
and attorney's fee awards, but strengthen the citizen suit instrument by
addressing many of the issues left unresolved in 1977.
Part I of this Article provides an overview of the pre-1990 Act. Part II
discusses the legacy of continuing problems under the Act and the 1977
Amendments, for example, the myriad of confusing and contradictory
judicial interpretations. Part III focuses on the new provisions of the
1990 Amendments directed at problems inherent in earlier versions of
the legislation. Part IV addresses four major issues that remain un-
resolved after the 1990 Amendments.
I. THE 1977 CITIZEN SUIT PROVISIONS
The histories of the 1970 legislation and 1977 Amendments reveal
Congress' dual intent to use citizen suits-or at least the threat of them-
7. 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a)(1) (1988).
8. 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a)(2) (1988).
9. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 555(b) (1966).
10. 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1) (1988).
11. Pub. L. No. 95-95, tit. III, § 303(a)-(c). 91 Stat. 771, 772 (1977); Pub. L. No. 95-
190, § 14(a)(77), (78). 91 Stat. 1404 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a)(3)
(1988)).
12. 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a)(3) (1988).
13. See Gwaltney, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., 484 U.S. 49, 62 (1987) (remedies
available pursuant to the citizen suit provisions authorized by the Clean Air Act are
"wholly injunctive in nature").
14. Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399 (1990) (to be codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 7401-7626).
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to goad the responsible agencies into more vigorous enforcement of the
Act and, if the agencies remained passive, to provide a backup enforce-
ment mechanism. 5
For purposes of formal analysis, the citizen suit provisions of the 1970
Act, including the 1977 Amendments, are contained in six subpara-
graphs that address: (a) authorization of the civil action and jurisdiction,
(b) notice, (c) venue and intervention, (d) attorney's fees and security, (e)
non-restriction of other rights of action, and (f) definitions.' 6 Section
307(b)(1) of the Act, a related measure also enacted in 1970, details mat-
ters relating to judicial review of final actions.' 7 These provisions collec-
tively outline a procedural as well as substantive road map for a citizen
plaintiff who seeks to prosecute a violation of the Clean Air Act.
The requirements for citizen suits after the 1977 Act have been neither
numerous nor complex. They are designed to serve as an early warning
system to prompt compliance by an alleged violator before formal litiga-
tion can be initiated.'S These requirements, however, are not meant to be
so stringent as to keep meritorious citizen claims out of the courts if
notice to the alleged violator is not enough to compel compliance.' 9 The
congressional objective of supplying simple and efficient procedures to
allow viable citizen complaints into court, without opening a floodgate of
litigation, is also evidenced by the Act's relaxed jurisdictional
requirements.
A. Jurisdiction
Federal jurisdiction over citizen suits is statutory. The Act vests juris-
diction in the district courts for three principal types of actions:
(1) violations of emissions standards or of an order issued by the EPA
Administrator or a state;
(2) alleged failure by the Administrator to perform an act or duty
which is not discretionary; and
(3) to enjoin proposed and actual construction of a major emitting fa-
cility without a permit.2°
15. See S. REP. No. 1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1970); 116 CONG. REC. 32,902,
32,903 (1970) (comments of Sens. Muskie and Boggs); Baughman v. Bradford Coal Co.,
592 F.2d 215, 218 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 961 (1979).
16. 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (1988).
17. 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1) (1988).
18. See Friends of the Earth v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 546 F. Supp. 1357, 1361
(D.D.C. 1982).
19. See Friends of the Earth v. Carey, 535 F.2d 165, 172-73 (2d Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 902 (1977).
20. See 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a) (1988). Section 7604(a) reads in part:
(a) Authority to bring civil action; jurisdiction
Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, any person may com-
mence a civil action on his own behalf -
(1) against any person (including (i) the United States, and (ii) any other gov-
ernmental instrumentality or agency to the extent permitted by the [e]leventh
[a]mendment to the Constitution) who is alleged to be in violation of (A) an
1991]
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1. Violation of emission standards or orders
Under section 304(a) a citizen may commence a civil suit against any
person who is alleged to be in violation of an emission standard or limita-
tion, or of an order issued by the Administrator.21 The original Act, as
amended in 1977, required a defendant to be in violation at the time the
action was filed.2 2 The Supreme Court, however, has determined that
the language of section 304(a) requires that the plaintiff "allege a state of
either continuous or intermittent violation - that is, a reasonable likeli-
hood that a past polluter will continue to pollute in the future.
23
2. Jurisdiction over nondiscretionary EPA action
Jurisdiction is conferred on the district courts for actions brought by a
citizen plaintiff directly against the Administrator for failing to perform a
nondiscretionary duty.24 The problem with this cause of action is that
the distinction between discretionary and nondiscretionary duties is not
always readily apparent.25
emission standard or limitation under this chapter or (B) an order issued by the
Administrator or a [s]tate with respect to such a standard or limitation,
(2) against the Administrator where there is alleged a failure of the Administra-
tor to perform any act or duty under this chapter which is not discretionary
with the Administrator, or
(3) against any person who proposes to construct or constructs any new or
modified major emitting facility without a permit required under part C of sub-
chapter I of this chapter (relating to significant deterioration of air quality) or
part D of subchapter I of this chapter (relating to nonattainment) or who is
alleged to be in violation of any condition of such permit.
Id.
21. 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a)(1) (1988). See, e.g., Wilder v. Thomas, 854 F.2d 605 (2d Cir.
1988) (failure of state to eliminate carbon monoxide hot spots not eligible for suit by
citizens) cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1053 (1989); League to Save Lake Tahoe, Inc. v.
Trounday, 598 F.2d 1164 (9th Cir. 1979) (federal jurisdiction exists to review state ad-
ministrative determinations regarding SIPs), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 943; Illinois v. Com-
monwealth Edison Co., 490 F. Supp. 1145 (N.D. Ill. 1980) (operating permit requirement
for utility is an emission standard).
22. 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a)(7) (1988).
23. Gwaltney, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., 484 U.S. 49, 57 (1987). Although
Gwaltney was a Clean Water Act case, the Court found the meaning and language relat-
ing to present violations to be identical to that used in the Clean Air Act. The Court
stated that "the 'alleged to be in violation' language of the citizen suit provisions of the
two Acts is not accidental; rather, the two provisions share the common central purpose
of permitting citizens to abate pollution when the government cannot or will not com-
mand compliance." Id. at 62. See also Note, Subject Matter Jurisdiction, Standing and
Citizen Suits: The Effect of Gwaltney v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Inc., 48 MD. L.
REV. 403 (1989) [hereinafter Note, Subject Matter Jurisdiction] (Congress modeled the
Clean Water Act citizen suit provisions after those of the Clean Air Act and the legisla-
tive history suggests that Congress intended that the two provisions be comparable de-
spite changes introduced).
24. 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a)(2) (1988).
25. Compare NRDC v. New York State Dep't of Envtl. Conservation, 700 F. Supp.
173 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (the Act imposes a mandatory duty on the Administrator to specify
a revision date for an inadequate SIP and this duty is nondiscretionary); with Kennecott
Copper Corp. v. Costle, 572 F.2d 1349 (9th Cir. 1978) (determination of whether ambient
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Generally, the Administrator's nondiscretionary duties are found
throughout the provisions of the Clean Air Act.26 Examples of such
nondiscretionary duties include: (1) enforcement of regulations set out in
a state implementation plan (SIP); (2) enforcement of limitations con-
tained in an operating permit; (3) enforcement of the procedural require-
ments embodied in a SIP; and (4) issuance of notice to that state of a
violation of its implementation plan." The duty to order a revision of an
inadequate SIP is also mandatory, but the Administrator has discretion
as to the date of the revision.2" The term "nondiscretionary" should be
given limited application in order to effectuate Congress' intent to limit
the number of citizen suits brought against the Administrator and to
lessen disruption of the administrative process.2 9
In contrast, discretionary duties, which are not appropriate for citizen
suits, are those which the Act does not specifically require. The prelimi-
nary determination of whether a duty is discretionary may be decided by
a federal court. 30 Discretionary duties include the determination as to
whether the ambient air quality standards are being met3 I and the refusal
to begin an investigation of SIP violations.32
3. Construction or modification without a permit
The 1977 Amendments provided citizens with a cause of action:
"against any person who proposes to construct or constructs any new or
modified major emitting facility without a permit. . . or who is alleged to
be in violation of any condition of such permit. '3 3 This right of citizen
action is not dependent on any action or inaction by the Administrator.
If a citizen believes that the permit requirements of the Act have been
violated, the citizen has the right to immediately file a complaint under
section 304(a)(3).34
4. Relaxed jurisdictional requirements
Congress' justification for granting jurisdiction to district courts relies
air quality standards are being met is infused with discretion and therefore is an inappro-
priate subject for citizen suit).
26. See Mountain States Legal Found. v. Costle, 630 F.2d 754, 766 (10th Cir. 1980)
cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1050 (1981); NRDC v. New York State Dep't of Envtl. Conserva-
tion, 700 F. Supp. at 177 (Administrator has a nondiscretionary duty to review the SIP
under § 110 of the Clean Air Act).
27. Wisconsin Envtl. Decade, Inc. v. Wisconsin Power and Light Co., 395 F. Supp.
313, 318-19 (W.D. Wis. 1975).
28. NRDC v. New York State Dep't of Envtl. Conservation, 700 F. Supp. at 177.
29. Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Costle, 572 F.2d at 1353.
30. See NRDC v. Train, 411 F. Supp. 864 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 545 F.2d 320 (2d Cir.
1976) (section 7604(a) grants district courts jurisdiction to decide whether a function is
mandatory or discretionary).
31. Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Costle, 572 F.2d 1349, 1354 (9th Cir. 1978).
32. City of Seabrook v. Costle, 659 F.2d 1371, 1374 (5th Cir. 1981).
33. 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a)(3) (1988).
34. Id.
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more on the specific issues presented than on the citizenship of the par-
ties or the amount in controversy. 5 Under the provisions of section
304(a),36 the district courts are granted absolute jurisdiction over the
three types of cases enumerated in the statute. This relaxation of federal
jurisdictional requirements for citizens who bring actions under section
304(a) was deemed essential to endow citizens with a meaningful supervi-
sory role over Clean Air Act violations."
B. Notice
Section 304(b), which governs the procedural requirement of notice,
was adopted by Congress as a means of allowing the polluter, the Admin-
istrator or other officials to rectify a violation of the Act.38 The notice
requirements of the citizen suit provisions require that no action may be
commenced:
(I) without sixty days notice to the Administrator, the [s]tate and the
alleged violator, or
(2) if the Administrator or state has commenced and is diligently pros-
ecuting the violation (however, the citizen plaintiff may intervene
as a matter of right), or
(3) prior to sixty days after the citizen plaintiff has given notice to the
Administrator.39
There are two exceptions to the notice requirement of section 304(b).
Notice to the Administrator of his failure to perform a mandatory duty
may be disregarded if the alleged EPA default is the granting of an ex-
emption from a national emission standard by the Administrator.'
35. Id. § 7604(a).
36. The last paragraph of § 304(a) of the 1977 amended version of the Clean Air Act
states in pertinent part: "The district courts shall have jurisdiction, without regard to the
amount in controversy or the citizenship of the parties, to enforce such an emission stan-
dard or limitation, or such an order, or to order the Administrator to perform such act or
duty, as the case may be." 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a) (1988).
37. See S. REP. No. 1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 2, 36-30 (1970); 116 CONG. REc. 32,
902-18 (1970) (comments of Sens. Muskie and Boggs).
38. Friends of the Earth v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 546 F. Supp. 1357, 1361
(D.D.C. 1982).
39. See 42 U.S.C. § 7604(b) (1988). Section 7604(b) states:
No action may be commenced-
(1) under subsection (a)(1) of this section-
(A) prior to 60 days after the plaintiff has given notice of the violation (i) to the
Administrator, (ii) to the [s]tate in which the violation occurs, and (iii) to any
alleged violator of the standard limitation, or order, or
(B) if the Administrator or [s]tate has commenced and is diligently prosecuting
a civil action in a court of the United States or a [s]tate to require compliance
with the standard, limitation or order, but in any such action in a court of the
United States any person may intervene as a matter of right.
(2) [no action may be commenced] under subsection (a)(2) [action against the
Administrator to perform a nondiscretionary duty] of this section prior to 60
days after the plaintiff has given notice of such action to the Administrator.
40. Id. § 7412(c)(1)(B) (the Administrator may grant a waiver for up to two years
after the effective date of a pollution standard).
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Also, if the Administrator has issued an order to the violator to comply
with the requirements of an applicable implementation plan, the citizen
plaintiff may file his complaint without giving any notice.4' Under these
limited circumstances the citizen plaintiff may bring suit immediately af-
ter notification as prescribed by the Administrator.42
C. Venue and Intervention
Section 304(c) covers venue and intervention by the Administrator and
is consistent with traditional federal venue rules. It requires the citizen
suit to be brought only in the judicial district in which the violating
source is located.43
The intervention provision in section 304(b) allows a citizen to inter-
vene as a matter of right in an action to which he is not already a party."
Section 304(c) allows the Administrator to intervene as a matter of right
where he is not already a party.
45
D. Attorney's Fees
Section 304(d) provides for attorney's fees, at the court's discretion,
whenever such an award is determined to be appropriate.46 This section
states that, "the court, in issuing any final order in any action brought
41. Id. § 7413(a). This section requires the Administrator to issue an order for the
violator to comply with the applicable implementation plan within 30 days of notification
of the violation. If the violation is so widespread that it appears that the reason for the
violation is the failure of the state to effectively enforce an implementation plan, the state
must be notified. If the failure of the state to enforce the plan extends past day 30 of this
notification, the Administrator must also notify the public. After giving the public notice
of the default by the state, the Administrator may enforce the implementation plan by
issuing an order to the state to comply with the plan or by bringing a civil action under
§ 7413(b). The Administrator may also issue an order under this section when he finds
that any person is in violation of new source performance standards, hazard emission
standards or energy related standards. The Administrator may enjoin the construction
or modification of any major emitting source if appropriate. An order issued pursuant to
this section is not effective until the violator has had an opportunity to confer with the
Administrator. This affords the violator the same due process considerations as the no-
tice provision of the citizen suit statute. Therefore, the citizen plaintiff may bring an
action immediately after the Administrator issues an order or brings a civil action pursu-
ant to this section.
42. Id. § 7604(b)
No [citizen] action may be commenced [without notice] except that such action
may be brought immediately after such notification in the case of an action
under this section respecting a violation of section 7412(c)(l)(B) of this title or
an order issued by the Administrator pursuant to section 7413(a) of this title.
Notice under this subsection shall be given in such manner as the Administrator
shall prescribe by regulation.
43. See 42 U.S.C. § 7604(c)(1) (1988). Section 7604(c) requires: "(1) Any action re-
specting a violation by a stationary source of an emission standard or limitation or an
order respecting such standard or limitation may be brought only in the judicial district
in which source is located."
44. Id. § 7604(b)(1)(B).
45. Id. § 7604(c)(2).
46. Id. § 7604(d).
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pursuant to... this section, may award costs of litigation (including
reasonable attorney and expert witness fees) to any party, whenever the
court determines such award is appropriate."47
The possibility that the costs of litigation would exceed the amount
awarded to a plaintiff in a citizen suit was seen by Congress as having a
potentially chilling effect on citizens initiating litigation that may be ben-
eficial to the public. To prevent this, and to encourage citizen suits, Con-
gress authorized courts to award attorney's fees to prevailing plaintiffs.48
E. Savings Clause
The provisions of section 304(e) insure the retention by the citizen
plaintiff of any rights that he may have under any statute or at common
law. Section (e) states in part: "[n]othing in this section shall restrict
any right which any person (or class of persons) may have under any
statute or common law to seek enforcement ... [of the Act] or to seek
any other relief."49
The reservation of certain rights to state, local and interstate authori-
ties, also found in this section, reflects Congress' original intent to rely on
these levels of government to be collectively responsible for enforcement.
The states, as well as any other local or interstate authorities, retain the
right to bring actions in state or local courts or to bring administrative
actions against any federal governmental unit.50 This reservation of
common law rights to local authorities, represents an accommodation of
state and municipal law, which is generally the primary source of air
pollution control and abatement standards."
F. Emission Standards or Limitations
Section 304(f) of the Act, which was added in the 1977 Amendments,
defines the phrase "emission standard or limitation."52 It is given a
broad definition under the statute and has been further broadened by
47. 42 U.S.C. § 7604(d) (1988). This section also grants the court the discretion to
require adequate security where a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction
is sought. If the court requires the filing of a bond, the security must be ordered in
compliance with FED. R. Civ. P. 62(b).
48. See H.R. REP. No. 294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., at 337 (1977), reprinted in 1977
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1077, 1416 [hereinafter H.R. REP. No. 294].
49. 42 U.S.C. § 7604(e) (1988).
50. Id.
51. See id. § 7418(b). Compliance by the federal government in the same manner as
nongovernmental entities is governed by § 7418. This section requires federal compliance
with all local and interstate laws in the same manner as civilian entities. This compliance
is mandatory, despite any immunity for federal agencies under other rules of law. How-
ever, no federal- employee may be held personally liable for any civil penalty for which he
is not otherwise liable. Section 7418(b) provides exemptions for federal entities under the
Clean Air Act if the President determines that the violation of the Act is "in the para-
mount interest of the United States."
52. Id. § 7604(0.
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judicial interpretation."3 Generally, this phrase refers to a state threshold
or limit on emissions that is legally binding and aimed at attaining or
maintaining air quality standards.
Emission standards encompass transportation control measures, 54 pro-
cedural provisions of state implementation plans,"5 and operating permit
requirements, 56 as well as other limitations designed to reduce pollu-
tion.57 A citizen suit may be brought for a violation of a limit contained
in a SIP5" relating to such transportation control measures, air quality
plans, inspection and maintenance programs, or vapor recovery require-
ments. 59 In order to sustain a citizen suit under the Act, a plaintiff must
allege a violation of a specific strategy or commitment in the SIP and
describe, with particularity, how the compliance is deficient. 6
G. Review of Final Agency Actions Under Section 307
In addition to the section 304 rights, which provide for federal district
court actions, section 307(b)(1) establishes a separate right of judicial re-
view of the Administrator's final actions.6 Section 307 enumerates the
types of actions suitable for review by an appellate court. 62 There is also
a catch-all provision that permits a citizen to petition for review of "any
other final action of the Administrator under this chapter."63 The term
"other final action" has been construed to include partial approval or
53. See League to Save Lake Tahoe, Inc. v. Trounday, 598 F.2d 1164, 1173 (9th Cir.)
(emission standards language in § 304 of the Act includes limits on the construction size
of a source facility, conditions in the application for registration approval and permitting
procedure), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 943 (1979).
54. Id at 1170.
55. See Kentucky ex rel. Hancock v. Ruckelshaus, 497 F.2d 1172, 1176 (6th Cir.
1974), aff'd sub nom. Hancock v. Train, 426 U.S. 167 (1976).
56. See Illinois v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 490 F. Supp. 1145, 1150 (N.D. Ill.
1980).
57. See Friends of the Earth v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 419 F. Supp. 528, 533-34
(D.D.C. 1976) (visible emission limitations designed to reduce pollution more than pri-
mary or secondary air quality standards may be contained in the state implementation
plan, and such limitations are enforceable by way of citizen suits); Atlantic Terminal
Urban Renewal Area Coalition v. New York City Dep't Envtl. Protection, 697 F. Supp.
157, 160 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (the provision in the state implementation plan, in which the
city committed to implement mitigating measures if the environmental impact statement
for the project proposal identified a violation of carbon monoxide standard, was "an emis-
sion standard or limitation" which could form the basis for a citizen suit); Wilder v.
Thomas, 659 F. Supp. 1500, 1505 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (a citizen plaintiff may bring a citizen
action for violation of an emission standard or limitation if a condition or requirement
relating to transportation control measures, air quality maintenance plans, vehicle inspec-
tion programs, or vapor recovery requirements, is breached), affid, 854 F.2d 605 (2d Cir.
1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1053 (1989).
58. 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (1988).
59. Wilder v. Thomas, 659 F. Supp. at 1505.
60. Id. See also League to Save Lake Tahoe, Inc. v. Trounday, 598 F.2d 1164, 1173-
74 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 943 (1979).
61. See 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1) (1988).
62. Id.
63. Id.
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disapproval of a SIP," reclassification of an area as a nonattainment
area,6" deferral of a mandatory action,66 and an order directing the
owner of a facility under construction to cease work on the project.6 7
Section 307(b) allows for direct petition to an appellate court for a
review of the Administrator's "final action." In contrast, citizen suits
dealing with the violations of an emission standard, or unreasonable de-
lay by the Administrator, or the construction or operation in violation of
a permit, must be brought before the district courts.
The venue of cases for judicial review under section 307(b) is divided.6"
If laws are of national scope or effect, then the appropriate forum for the
Administrator's final action is the appellate court in the District of Co-
lumbia Circuit Court.69 Final Agency decisions affecting only regional
or local areas are reviewable in the circuit court that has local
jurisdiction.7 °
II. PROBLEMS OF CITIZEN ENFORCEMENT AFTER 1977
Citizen suit provisions in the 1977 Amendments to the Act were
designed to enable a citizen plaintiff to bolster the government enforce-
ment effort. 7 1 Despite the optimistic goal of the legislation, citizen liti-
gants in practice, frequently found themselves shut out of court.7 2
Courts were often presented with repetitive violations that were purely
retrospective in nature and, therefore, not within the EPA jurisdiction
conferred by section 304. Also, the limited relief available to citizens was
seldom sufficient incentive to expend the large amounts of time, energy
and money necessary to prosecute violations.
In addition, the citizen suit provisions proved to be ambiguous and,
therefore, subject to judicial interpretation. Such judicial interpretation
has often resulted in decisions that limit citizen action and recovery. 3 In
particular, the various judicial applications of section 304 have compli-
64. Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. EPA, 782 F.2d 645, 652 (7th Cir. 1986).
65. Id.
66. See Maine v. Thomas, 690 F. Supp. 1106, 1111 (D. Me. 1988) (EPA's publicly
announced decision to defer action becomes a final action for the purposes of review
under the Clean Air Act), affd 874 F.2d 883 (1st Cir. 1989). But see City of Seabrook v.
Costle, 659 F.2d 1371, 1373 (5th Cir. 1981) (EPA may defer decision to begin investiga-
tion of alleged Clean Air Act violations).
67. Solar Turbines, Inc. v. Seif, 688 F. Supp. 1012, 1013-14 (M.D. Pa. 1988), aff'd
879 F.2d 1073 (3d Cir. 1989).
68. 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1) (1988).
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. See id. § 7604.
72. Gwaltney, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., 484 U.S. 49 (1987). The prospective
nature of jurisdiction under the Clean Air Act immunized polluters who violated the act
only once or only in the past, no matter how serious the violation. This jurisdictional
loophole protected serious first-time and past violations of the Act from citizen suits,
thereby frustrating the clean air goals sought through citizen enforcement of the Act.
73. See CITIZEN'S SUITS AND ATTORNEY'S FEES, 317 ALI-ABA 829 (1988).
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cated the requirements of citizen standing.74 Judicial debate over avail-
able remedies under section 304 and the appropriate award of attorney's
fees further frustrated citizen prosecutions.
A. Jurisdictional Issues
Court-derived tests of constitutional and statutory standing under the
citizen provisions disclosed what was arguably the most pressing defect
remaining in the citizen enforcement machinery after the 1977 Amend-
ments - the lack of jurisdiction over past violations."' Fundamentally,
the jurisdiction of the federal courts is defined by article III of the United
States Constitution. The jurisdictional tenets drawn by the courts from
provisions in the Constitution profoundly affect the authority of the
courts in cases brought under section 304 of the Clean Air Act.
1. Article III Issues
The question of proper federal jurisdiction in any case begins with an
examination of whether the cause of action meets the constitutional re-
quirements of article III. Pursuant to article III, the judicial power of
the federal courts is restricted to cases and controversies.76 Embodied in
the words "cases or controversies" are the doctrines of justiciability77
and standing.78
With regard to the article III justiciability requirement, the Supreme
Court has interpreted section 304(a) to prohibit a court from deciding
cases solely on "wholly past violations" on the grounds that such a case
would be moot.79 Consistent with this interpretation, a citizen bringing
suit was required to allege in good faith an ongoing noncompliance with
74. Id.
75. Cf. Gwaltney, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., 484 U.S. at 62-63. This shortcom-
ing in the Act was the battleground in the Gwaltney case. The case highlights this defi-
ciency in the citizen enforcement arsenal under the Clean Air Act.
76. U.S. CoNsT. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
77. Justiciability means that the issues cannot be moot, the opinions cannot be advi-
sory and the court cannot decide political questions. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95
(1968). The principle of mootness has been particularly important in citizen suit litiga-
tion because the pre-1990 Amendments conferred jurisdiction over citizen suits only if
the violation was current or intermittent. Gardeski v. Colonial Sand & Stone Co., 501 F.
Supp. 1159, 1161 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). In a minor expansion of this rule, it has been held
that even if a violation did not exist as of the commencement of the suit, a claim would
exist if it could be shown that the violation had not ended, but was merely dormant or
intermittent and therefore likely to recur. Id.
78. Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United, Inc., 454 U.S. 464 (1982).
79. Cf Gwaltney, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., 484 U.S. 49, 62-63 (1987).
Gwaltney is a Clean Water Act case, but the language which the Court analyzes is identi-
cal to the language in the Clean Air Act. The Supreme Court in Gwaltney notes that the
Clean Water Act affords a remedy only where the violation is presently occurring. The
Gwaltney case also permits jurisdiction over intermittent or sporadic violations until a
time when there is no real likelihood of repetition. In Clean Water Act cases subsequent
to Gwaltney, courts have allowed the plaintiffs' cases to withstand the defenses of moot-
ness where defendants remain legally empowered to recommence the challenged dis-
charges in the future. See Gardeski v. Colonial Sand & Stone Co., 501 F. Supp. at 1161.
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the Act.8" If the violation occurred in the past or the defendant could
prove absolutely that the violation could not be expected to recur, the
action would be dismissed as moot.81
The second major issue stemming from article III is standing. The
Supreme Court has construed the standing doctrine as encompassing
three distinct elements.82 First, the party seeking review must have suf-
fered some real or threatened injury as a result of the challenged action
(injury-in-fact). Second, the injury must be caused by the challenged ac-
tion (causation). Finally, the injury must be capable of redress by a court
decision. 3
In decisions dealing with citizen standing under the Clean Air Act,
injury-in-fact has proved the most elusive of the three parameters. Some
courts have concluded that no injury-in-fact is required under section
304(a).84 Other courts have held that some showing relating to injury-in-
fact is required for the citizen's claim to withstand a motion for dismis-
sal, but that a mere increased risk of injury is sufficient.8 5
The Supreme Court held in United States v. Students Challenging Reg-
ulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), that the injury-in-fact need not be
great and that even "an identifiable trifle" would be sufficient to substan-
tiate standing.86 However, in Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation,7
80. Gwaltney, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., 484 U.S. at 65-66 (holding that Con-
gress intended good faith allegations grounded in fact to suffice for jurisdictional
purposes).
81. Id. In a sense, the Supreme Court's decision in Gwaltney relegated claims con-
cerning wholly past violations to the status not of moot claims, but of nonclaims. As a
matter of statutory interpretation, a wholly past violation did not sound within the Act at
all.
82. Valley Forge Christian College, 454 U.S. at 472.
83. Id.
84. See Friends of the Earth v. Carey, 535 F.2d 165, 172-73 (2d Cir. 1976) (while
injury-in-fact is not required under the citizen suit provisions of the Clean Air Act, the
relevant issue is whether the suit is justiciable), cert. denied 434 U.S. 902 (1977); Metro-
politan Wash. Coalition for Clean Air v. District of Columbia, 511 F.2d 809, 814 (D.C.
Cir. 1975) (a citizen organization has standing to litigate the claim of a violation of the
Act without alleging "injury-in-fact" where Congress has determined that "any citizen"
was a proper party to bring suit under the citizen suit provisions of the Clean Air Act).
Arguably, proof of injury-in-fact should not affect the standing of citizen plaintiffs be-
cause they should be treated as if they were the Attorney General. Congress' intent was
to encourage citizens to act as private attorneys general for the purpose of enforcing the
Act. This is confirmed by the statute's legislative history as well as by the abandonment
of traditional jurisdictional barriers. CITIZEN SUITS AND ATTORNEY'S FEES, supra note
73. It is well established that when the Attorney General brings a suit against a polluter,
proof of injury-in-fact is not an issue. See Note, Subject Matter Jurisdiction, supra note
23 at 403.
85. Wilderness Society v. Griles, 824 F.2d 4, 12 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
86. United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP),
412 U.S. 669, 689 n.14 (1973) (quoting with approval Davis, Standing: Taxpayers and
Others, 35 U. CHI. L. REV. 601, 613 (1968)). SCRAP involves the National Environmen-
tal Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) not the Clean Air Act. However, the injury-in-fact dis-
cussion in SCRAP is relevant for the purposes of the Clean Air Act because the citizen
plaintiffs in SCRAP alleged the same type of injury frequently asserted by plaintiffs under
the clean air laws. Specifically, the citizen plaintiffs in SCRAP brought suit under the
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the Court clarified its earlier position by stating that the "identifiable tri-
fle" standard was applicable only to the particular facts of the SCRAP
case, and that a more substantial degree of injury-in-fact would generally
be required for standing.8" The Court also stated that the SCRAP stan-
dard was an "expansive expression [of injury-in-fact] ... and has never
since been emulated by this Court." 9 Although the majority9° in Lujan
intended to limit the former liberal interpretation of injury-in-fact for the
purposes of section 304(a), the Court did not specify the type of injury
sufficient to constitute standing. The Supreme Court instead left lower
courts with an amorphous standard that invites varying interpretations.
In addition to justiciability and standing, jurisdiction by a federal
court depends on several judicially created prudential or statutory con-
siderations. These may prevent a court from exercising jurisdiction de-
spite a plaintiff's showing of sufficient justiciability and standing in the
article III sense.91
2. Prudential Considerations
The current prevailing analysis concerning standing encompasses two
components: constitutional and prudential. The District of Columbia
Circuit Court in Hazardous Waste Treatment Council v. EPA92 held that:
For constitutional standing, a plaintiff must allege personal injury
fairly traceable to the defendant's allegedly unlawful conduct and
likely to be redressed by the requested relief.93 For prudential stand-
ing, a plaintiff usually must show, in addition, that "the interest sought
to be protected by the complainant is arguably within the zone of inter-
ests to be protected or regulated by the statute ... in question."
94
Under the zone of interest test, the "essential inquiry is whether Con-
gress intended for [a particular] class [of plaintiffs] to be relied upon to
challenge agency disregard of the law.' 9
citizen action provisions of NEPA for the harm to recreational areas due to the use of
nonrecyclable goods by railroads. The "aesthetic well-being and quality of life" argu-
ments used by the plaintiffs in SCRAP were found substantial enough to constitute in-
jury-in-fact under the NEPA statute.
87. 110 S. Ct. 3177 (1990).
88. Id. at 3189.
89. Id.
90. Justice Scalia delivered the opinion in Lujan in which Chief Justice Rehnquist,
Justices White, O'Connor, and Kennedy joined. Justice Blackmun filed a dissenting opin-
ion in which Justices Brennan, Marshall and Stevens joined.
91. See Wardinski, The Doctrine of Standing: Barriers to Judicial Review in the D.C.
Circuit, 5 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 7 (1990).
92. Hazardous Waste Treatment Council v. EPA, 861 F.2d 277, 281 (D.C. Cir. 1988)
[hereinafter HWTC II], cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1106 (1989).
93. Id. at 281-82 (citing Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United, Inc.,
454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982)).
94. Id. at 282 (quoting Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S.
150, 153 (1970)).
95. Id. (quoting Clarke v. Securities Indus. Ass'n, 479 U.S. 388, 389 (1987)). See
generally Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United, Inc., 454 U.S. 464 (1982).
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Thus, not only' must the constitutional standing factors be considered,
but the court must also engage in a review of the intent of Congress to
confer standing to a particular plaintiff under the statute involved. How-
ever, the Supreme Court has made it clear that the "zone of interests"
test should not be used in all cases. Even when it is appropriately em-
ployed, different interpretations may be required depending upon the
context of the case.9
6
These prudential criteria will be of critical importance in two contexts
of citizen enforcement under the Act. First, in suits brought by citizens
under section 307(b) of the Clean Air Act, for review of final Agency
action, prudential standing will determine whether the case gets into
court. Second, in suits under section 304, a "zone of interest" evaluation
will likely have value as courts determine whether the citizen is a plaintiff
that Congress sought to protect.
The District of Columbia Circuit Court held that citizens seeking re-
view of final Agency action must show that the statute creates a pre-
sumption of standing in their favor97 or that the plaintiff is a particularly
suitable challenger of administrative neglect, and therefore, Congress
would have intended the plaintiff to have standing. 9
In HWTC II,99 the D.C. Circuit struggled with the test of standing
that demands less than a showing of explicit congressional intent to bene-
fit, but more than a marginal relationship to the statutory purpose in
cases brought forward for review of Agency action. The court recog-
nized that to give standing to any plaintiff who is merely disadvantaged
by the EPA's action or whose interests are marginally related to the pur-
pose of the statute would destroy the requirement of prudential standing;
because any party with constitutional standing would, therefore, be in a
position to bring suit. Ultimately, the D.C. Circuit Court decided that
the plaintiffs in HWTC II had standing to challenge EPA rules because
this challenge advanced the goal of the relevant statute to regulate pollu-
tion from improper disposal techniques. However, the court also found
that the plaintiffs, who had brought actions for competitive losses under
the same solid waste disposal law, had no standing to sue because such
96. Clarke v. Securities Indus. Ass'n, 479 U.S. at 400 n.16. "While inquiries into
reviewability or prudential standing in other contexts may bear some resemblance to a
'zone of interest' inquiry under the APA [Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702],
it is not a test of universal application."
97. See HWTC II, 861 F.2d 277, 283 (D.C. Cir. 1988), cert. denied 490 U.S. 1106
(1989) (if it were Congress' intent to benefit a particular class of plaintiffs, there would be
a presumption of standing). The HWTC II case was decided pursuant to the Administra-
tive Procedure Act, sections 701-06, which permits appellate review of final EPA actions.
5 U.S.C. §§ 701-06 (1988). The action was not brought under the Clean Air Act, but
instead under the Solid Waste Disposal Act which authorizes review of final agency rul-
ings. 42 U.S.C. § 6976(a)(1) (1988). The Clean Air Act, in § 307, explicitly incorporates
the right of review under the APA into the Act itself. See 42 U.S.C. § 7607 (1988).
98. HWTC II, 861 F.2d at 283.
99. 861 F.2d at 277.
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losses were not within the zone of interests protected by the statute.'0°
In regard to section 304 suits challenging a decision of the EPA not to
prosecute, an argument can be made that prudential standing should be
interpreted broadly. Supreme Court decisions under various federal stat-
utes, other than the Clean Air Act, indicate that where the potential
plaintiff is the subject of the underlying statute, prudential considerations
should not bar standing.' 0 ' Although it is recognized that the prudential
limits set by the Supreme Court must be acknowledged in citizen suits
under the Clean Air Act,0 2 it is obvious that these limitations should not
be an obstacle where the Act contemplates that citizens are the proper
plaintiffs in suits concerning Agency inaction. 0 3
The Supreme Court has recognized that Congress can eliminate pru-
dential limitations by granting an express right of action in a statute, to
plaintiffs who would otherwise be barred by prudential rules." The
Court has held that so long as Congress has not manifested an intent to
preclude review, the prudential considerations test is satisfied if the plain-
tiff's interests bear a "plausible relationship" to the goals of the relevant
statute.'0 5 Despite this relaxation of prudential requirements by the
Supreme Court, several lower courts continue to impose significant pru-
dential barriers on otherwise sufficient citizen claims under the Clean Air
Act.10
6
100. Id. at 280.
101. See e.g., Clarke v. Securities Indus. Ass'n, 479 U.S. 388, 399.400 (1987) (the zone
of interests "test is not meant to be especially demanding; in particular, there need be no
indication of congressional purpose to benefit the would-be plaintiff").
102. See HWTC II, 861 F.2d 277, 282 (D.C. Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1106
(1989).
103. See Clarke v. Securities Indus. Ass'n, 479 U.S. at 399-403 (where Congress in-
tended for a particular class of plaintiffs to be relied upon to challenge the Administra-
tor's or the Agency's disregard of the law, the zone of interests test for prudential
standing is not necessary in determining a court's right to review because Congress has
intended that these plaintiffs have an automatic cause of action); Cf. Wardinski, The
Doctrine of Standing: Barriers to Review in the D. C. Circuit, 5 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T
7, 43 (1990) (zone of interests test was not intended by Congress to be especially demand-
ing and does not require an express indication of congressional purpose to benefit the
plaintiff).
104. See Clarke v. Securities Indus. Ass'n, 479 U.S. at 399 (where the potential plain-
tiff is the subject of the relevant statute, the "zone of interests" test cannot deny the right
to review).
105. Id. at 403 (where plaintiff asserts a plausible relationship to policies underlying
the statute in question, plaintiff has standing to request review of that statute).
106. See HWTC II, 861 F.2d at 283. Despite the Supreme Court's admonitions in
Clarke v. Securities Indus. Ass'n, 479 U.S. 388, 399-403 (1987), which cautioned lower
courts against applying substantial prudential barriers to review of agency action, the
District of Columbia Circuit Court in HWTC II dismissed, as inadequate to fulfill the
"zone of interests" test, damage to the competitive and commercial interests of an organi-
zational plaintiff. However, the statute in question did not specifically exclude this type
of plaintiff from seeking review. Nonetheless, the D.C. Circuit found that HWTC II did
not meet the precedential, or statutory, requirements of standing because "in the absence
of either some explicit evidence of an intent to benefit such firms, or some reason to
believe that such firms, similar to HWTC II, would be unusually suitable champions of
19911
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In summary, the Clean Air Act, as amended in 1977, fell short of its
goal of providing citizens with a feasible enforcement role because of the
prospective nature of its remedies and its sensitivity to judicial interpreta-
tion on the issue of standing.
B. Insufficiency of Remedies
The Clean Air Act, as amended through 1977, provided the citizen
plaintiff with a means of enforcing the standards set out by the Act and
recovering the costs of this enforcement." 7 The Act also enabled the
plaintiff to compel the Administrator to perform a mandatory duty.
However, since the original remedies were purely injunctive,'018 the Act
turned out to be far less effective than anticipated. Indeed, the unavaila-
bility of civil penalties as a deterrent against future violations weakened
the citizen enforcement weapon. Civil penalties were omitted as a rem-
edy under section 304 even though state law often permitted such awards
for clean air violations."9
C. Attorney's Fees
Section 304(d) allows the court to "award the costs of litigation (in-
cluding reasonable attorney and expert witness fees) to any party, when-
ever the court determines such award is appropriate."" 0 Pursuant to
this section, the Clean Air Act expressly permits citizens to seek review
of EPA promulgated air quality and emissions standards, and to be reim-
bursed for the expense of discharging their supervisory role."'
In 1977, the Supreme Court in Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club "2 held that
the primary purpose of the fee awards provision in section 304 was to
discourage frivolous litigation.' ' 3 This interpretation signaled that the
Congress' ultimate goals, no one would suppose them to have standing to attack regula-
tory laxity."
107. See 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a), (d) (1988); Note, Attorney's Fees and Ruckelshaus v.
Sierra Club: Discouraging Citizens from Challenging Administrative Agency Decisions, 33
AM. U. L. REV. 775, 783 (1984) [hereinafter Note, Attorney's Fees and Ruckelshaus]
(Congress tried to encourage beneficial litigation by authorizing courts to award attor-
ney's fees in several citizen suit statutes).
108. See Gwaltney, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., 484 U.S. 49, 62 (1987) (remedies
available pursuant to the citizen suit provisions authorized by the Clean Air Act are
"wholly injunctive in nature").
109. Illinois v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 490 F. Supp. 1145, 1151 (N.D. Ill. 1980).
110. 42 U.S.C. § 7604(d) (1988). Section 7604(d) allows either party to collect the
"costs of litigation." The costs recoverable under this section include attorney's fees and
expert witness fees. Other fees that may be awarded are listed in 28 U.S.C. § 1920. Id.
111. Note, Attorney's Fees and Ruckelshaus, supra note 107, at 776.
112. 463 U.S. 680 (1983).
113. Id. at 692-93. The opinion in Ruckelshaus states that the central purpose of
§ 304(d), (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7604(d)), which permits the award of fees, was to estab-
lish a barrier to potentially meritless suits that Congress feared would follow the authori-
zation of citizen suits under the Clean Air Act. Despite the Court's opinion, the Senate
Committee intended to discourage harassing suits by permitting fee awards to a defend-
ant who could show that the suit was brought in bad faith. There is no evidence from the
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fee awards section was a double-edged sword--encouraging citizen litiga-
tion, but also threatening a potential plaintiff with a surcharge in the
form of recompense of an adversary's costs if it was determined that the
plaintiff's suit was not brought in good faith.
The Ruckelshaus case is also noteworthy for setting a minimum eligi-
bility standard for fee awards to a partially successful plaintiff. The opin-
ion limits the discretion of the courts in awarding fees by forbidding such
awards to parties who achieve only slight or purely procedural suc-
cesses." 4 The Supreme Court's decision in Ruckelshaus put an end to
the controversy over whether fees could be awarded to an unsuccessful
plaintiff if the litigation nonetheless substantially contributed to further-
ing the Act's objectives by stating that a party must achieve some success
on the merits to be eligible to receive attorney's fees." 5
Having decided the "partial success" issue in Ruckelshaus, the
Supreme Court left significant fee issues unresolved. There is no clear
rule, for example, for collection of litigation costs by a plaintiff if the
claim is settled prior to a final decision by the court. I 6 Nor is it clear
whether fees may be awarded when the citizen plaintiff intervenes in an
action that the Administrator is "diligently prosecuting."" 7 These issues
are likely to leave potential plaintiffs in a quandary as to the possibility of
settling a claim or intervening in a suit that others have already begun to
prosecute.
Senate report that the "primary" purpose of the attorney's fee clause in the Clean Air Act
was to discourage such suits. Instead, the House and Senate appear to have been in
consensus that the primary purpose of the fee shifting provision was to encourage citizen
suits where the Administrator had failed to act. 116 CONG. REC. S32,925-27 (1970)
(statements of Sens. Hruska and Muskie) (Senate debate on statutory authorization of
§ 304); S. REP. No. 1196, 91st Cong., 2d. Sess. 38 (1970) (fee awards should discourage
abuse of citizen suit provision).
114. Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680, 688 n.9 (1983).
115. Id. at 691; Sierra Club v. Gorsuch, 672 F.2d 33, 39 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (Gorsuch
holds that although a party did not substantially prevail on the merits of its case, it may
still be awarded fees if the action contributed to the goals of the Clean Air Act), rev'd sub
nom. Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club 463 U.S. 680 (1983).
116. See Dawson, Lawyers and Involuntary Clients: Attorney's Fees From Funds, 87
HARV. L. REV. 1597, 1626 n.97 (1974); Note, Attorney's Fees and Ruckelshaus, supra
note 103, at 785. There are three exceptions to the American Rule which mandates that
each party must pay its own fees: (1) bad faith, (2) private attorney general, (3) the
common fund. In the common fund exception, success is not necessary. Settlement with-
out a final judgment is enough. Similarly, where a citizen plaintiff acts as a private attor-
ney general, any settlement which advances the goals of the Act should be eligible for an
award of the fees incurred by the citizen.
117. 42 U.S.C. § 7604(b)(7)(B) (1988) (intervention, as a matter of right, is permitted
by "any person"). See United States v. National Steel Corp., 782 F.2d 62 (6th Cir. 1986)
(citizen plaintiffs may be awarded fees only if the state or Administrator is not diligently
prosecuting the claim). See generally Baughman v. Bradford Coal Co., 592 F.2d 215 (3d
Cir.) (explanation of what constitutes "diligent prosecution" for the purposes of a citizen
suit under the Act), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 961 (1979); Student Public Interest Research
Group v. Fritzche Dodge & Olcott, 579 F. Supp. 1528 (D.N.J. 1984) (discussion of when
a citizen's suit is preempted by state or agency "diligent prosecution"), affid, 759 F.2d
1131 (3d Cir. 1985).
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D. Other Problems of Citizen Enforcement
In addition to the issues discussed above, potential citizen plaintiffs
also have a maze of other, less complex but nonetheless serious, obstacles
to overcome when contemplating a suit under section 304. These issues
are often important enough to keep citizen cases out of court unless recti-
fied before the defendant can move for dismissal.
1. The jurisdictional dichotomy between the district
and appellate courts
The 1977 Amendments left room for much jurisdictional uncertainty
between the district and appellate courts under sections 304 and 307.
District courts were given jurisdiction over suits brought under section
304(a), 1 ' and appellate courts were granted judicial review over final
agency decisions in section 307.19 This jurisdictional dichotomy has
created a puzzling allocation of the suits brought under the Clean Air
Act. 120
In Maine v. Thomas, 2 ' citizen organizations and states filed suit under
section 304(a)(2) alleging that the Administrator's promise of future ac-
tion on the issue of regional haze amounted to failure to perform a non-
discretionary duty.122 The plaintiff asserted that the promise was not a
"final action" under section 307(b), and that appellate jurisdiction under
section 307(b) was improper.
The district court's reception to the plaintiff's jurisdictional argument
can best be described as frosty. The district court dismissed the case on
the grounds that any EPA announcement to defer action, or not to act at
all, results in a final action for the purposes of review under section
307(b), and that the district court did not have jurisdiction to hear the
case. 123
118. Section 7604(a) grants jurisdiction to the district courts over actions to: (1) en-
force an emission standard, limitation or order issued by the Administrator, (2) compel
the Administrator to perform a nondiscretionary duty, (3) to stop the construction or
modification of a major emitting facility. 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a)(l)-(3) (1988).
119. Section 7607(b)(1) grants the appropriate circuit court jurisdiction over review of
final agency action. Id. § 7607(b)(1).
120. See Maine v. Thomas, 874 F.2d 883, 884 (1st Cir. 1989); Solar Turbines, Inc. v.
Seif, 897 F.2d 1073 (3d Cir. 1989) (description of the allocation of Clean Air Act cases
between the district court and the court of appeals); Greater Detroit Resource Recovery
v. EPA, 916 F.2d 317 (6th Cir. 1990) (description of the court of appeals jurisdiction
compared with district court jurisdiction under the Clean Air Act). Compare Natural
Resources Defense Council v. EPA, 902 F.2d 962 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (court of appeals has
jurisdiction over suits to compel the Administrator to revise NAAQS), with Environmen-
tal Defense Fund v. Thomas, 870 F.2d 892, 897 (2d Cir. 1989) (the federal district courts
have jurisdiction to compel the Administrator to take action to revise NAAQS or to
decline to revise these standards), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 537 (1989).
121. Maine v. Thomas, 874 F.2d at 883.
122. Id. at 886.
123. Maine v. Thomas, 690 F. Supp. 1106, 1110-12 (D. Me. 1988), aff'd 874 F.2d 883
(1st Cir. 1989).
CLEAN AIR AMENDMENTS OF 1990
The plaintiffs in Thomas appealed. The First Circuit agreed that the
district court did not have jurisdiction over the suit, but for different rea-
sons. The circuit court held that dismissal was proper because the peti-
tion for review of the Agency's final decision had not been filed within
sixty days as mandated by the statute.' 24 But the First Circuit rejected
the plaintiff's argument that the Agency had failed to fulfill its
mandatory duty of fighting regional pollution because, said the court, by
installing a future plan for air quality maintenance, the Agency had in-
deed satisfied its nondiscretionary duty under the Act.'25 The circuit
court stated that, although the Administrator's action was "entirely
promissory with respect to regional haze, [it] nevertheless amounted to a
'final action taken' within the ambit of [section 307(b) and] although
there is a route whereby citizens may require EPA to act on self-imposed
duties ... that route does not pass through the district court."' 126
Part of the difficulty in allocating these suits springs from the Adminis-
trator's authority to defer nondiscretionary decisions. Early cases under
the citizen suits provisions held that the Administrator could postpone
such decisions without having to contend with a collateral citizen suit in
the district courts under section 304.127 The citizen plaintiff had no re-
course in the district court for a review of a postponement decision, but
instead had to wait until the Administrator made a conclusive deci-
sion."' Only after the final decision was made could the citizen plaintiff
seek judicial review in the appropriate appellate court. The consequence
of these deferred decisions was that the polluter could violate clean
air standards during the postponement period without fear of
prosecution. 29
2. Interstate Pollution
The 1977 Act also failed to provide out-of-state citizens with a remedy
for violations originating within another state. The Clean Air Act origi-
nally did not regulate stationary sources of pollution; it simply desig-
nated certain air pollutants dangerous to public health. The Act then
established national emission standards (the NAAQS) for those pollu-
tants and charged state governments with the responsibility of imple-
menting regulations that complied with federal standards. 30
The Clean Air Act gives the states the freedom to adopt air quality
standards more stringent than those required by federal law.' 3' Nothing
in the Act, however, suggests that a state must respect a neighboring air
124. Maine v. Thomas, 874 F.2d 883, 887 (1st Cir. 1989).
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Delaware Citizens for Clean Air, Inc. v. Stauffer Chem. Co., 367 F. Supp. 1040,
1044 (D. Del. 1973), aff'd mem. 510 F.2d 969 (3d Cir. 1975).
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. 42 U.S.C. § 7412 (1988).
131. 42 U.S.C. § 7416 (1988).
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quality standard if the standard is more stringent than that required by
federal law.' 32 The 1977 Amendments seem to have been carefully
drafted to preclude that interpretation. 33
The Second Circuit decided that a neighboring state may only petition
for review of EPA action in another state, if the Agency action fails to
meet the minimum federal requirements established by the Act.'34 The
Second Circuit refused to overturn any action that complied with fed-
eral-but not neighboring state-standards. 35
The Supreme Court strengthened the Second Circuit position by hold-
ing in International Paper Co. v. Ouelette '36 that the federal Clean Air
Act preempts the common law of the affected state to the extent that
common law imposes liability on a source of pollution located in another
state. As a result of these findings, citizens have largely lost the power to
control serious, but federally acceptable, levels of pollution emanating
from out-of-state sources. 37 This limitation on interstate pollution suits
seriously undermines the Clean Air Act's goal of protecting regional air
quality. The problem is even more serious when the Administrator in
one state exempts a major emitting facility from compliance with his
state's SIP, even though this exemption has serious repercussions for
neighboring states. 31
3. Statute of Limitations
The absence of a specific statute of limitations in the 1977 Act has also
created uncertainty in citizen suits by leaving the issue to the states,
which have instituted different policies. In New Jersey, for example, the
court has consistently rejected attempts to enforce the Clean Air Act
under the state's two year statute of limitations for "any forfeiture upon
any penal statute. .. when the forfeiture is or shall be limited to the state
of New Jersey."'' 3 9 In other states, however, the courts have permitted
132. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(3)(A) (1988).
133. See Connecticut v. EPA, 656 F.2d 902 (2d Cir. 1981).
134. Id.
135. Id. at 909. The Second Circuit's opinion reads in relevant part, "[n]othing in the
Act, however, indicates that a state must respect its neighbor's air quality standards (or
design its SIP to avoid interference therewith) if those standards are more stringent than
the requirements of federal law." Id.
136. See International Paper Co. v. Ouelette, 479 U.S. 481, 494 (1987) (the opinion
concludes that "the Clean Water Act [like the Clean Air Act] precludes a court from
applying the law of an affected [s]tate against an out-of-state source").
137. See generally, Note, Federal Preemption of State Law Remedies, 49 LA. L. REv.
193 (1988) [hereinafter Note, Federal Preemption].
138. See Connecticut v. EPA, 656 F.2d at 902, 904 (2d Cir. 1981) (New Jersey and
Connecticut cited, in vain, the "strong, undesirable impact on air quality within their...
state boundaries" that would result from New York's approval of its state SIP which
authorized a "special limitation" for a "test burn" that allowed the use of the fuel oil with
maximum sulfur content).
139. See Student Public Interest Research Group v. Tenneco Polymers, 602 F. Supp.
1394, 1398-99 (D.N.J. 1985) [hereinafter SPIRG I]; Student Public Interest Research
Group v. Monsanto Co., 600 F. Supp. 1474, 1477 (D.N.J. 1985) [hereinafter SPIRG II]
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application of a state statute of limitations for citizen suits based on state
regulations or comparable actions brought by the government under the
Clean Air Act."4 It is critical for the potential citizen plaintiff to deter-
mine the applicable statute of limitations in his district. Failure to do so
could result in a procedural dismissal before the court ever reaches the
merits of the case.
III. THE 1990 AMENDMENTS TO THE CLEAN AIR ACT
The new citizen suit amendments, that comprise a small piece of this
landmark legislation, like the preexisting provisions, are designed to pro-
mote enforcement through the initiatives of private citizens. The 1990
Amendments strengthened the right of a citizen to act when the govern-
ment declines to pursue a violation.' 4'
The 1990 Amendments include five major changes concerning citizen
suits. Section 707(g) amends section 304(a) of the Act to include past
violations."42 Second, section 304(a) is amended by section 707(a) to per-
mit courts to award appropriate civil penalties."13  The third major
change was the addition to section 304(a) of language granting citizens
affid 891 F.2d 283 (3d Cir. 1989). See also, Sierra Club v. Simkins Indus., Inc., 617 F.
Supp. 1120, 1124-25 (D. Md. 1985), aff'd, 847 F. 2d 1109 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied
491 U.S. 904 (1989).
140. See Connecticut Fund for the Env't v. Job Plating Co., 623 F. Supp. 207 (D.
Conn. 1985) (because a citizen suit brought under the Clean Air Act is closely analogous
to an action brought under the Act on behalf of the United States, the five year statute of
limitations is applicable).
141. 136 CONG. REc. H12,896 (daily ed. Oct. 26, 1990) (comments of Collins, author
of the citizen suits provisions in the 1990 Clean Air Act, concerning the objective of the
provisions).
142. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a)(1), (3) with HOUSE COMM. ON CONFERENCE,
CLEAN AIR ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1990 CONFERENCE REPORT, H.R. REP. No. 952,
101st Cong., 2d Sess. 299 § 707(g) (1990), [hereinafter CONF. REP. 952]. Section 304(a)
(codified as 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a)) has been amended by § 707(g) to read:
(a) Authority to bring civil action; jurisdiction
(1) Except as provided in subsection (5) of this section any person may com-
mence a court action on his own behalf against any person (including (i) the
United States, and (ii) any other governmental instrumentality or agency to the
extent permitted by the [e]leventh [a]mendment to the Constitution) who is al-
leged to have violated (if there is evidence that the alleged violation has been
repeated) or to be in violation of (a) an emission standard or limitation under
this chapter or (b) an order issued by the Administrator or a [s]tate with respect
to such a standard or limitation....
(3) against any person who proposes to construct or constructs any new or
modified major emitting facility without a permit . . . or who is alleged to
have violated (if there is evidence that the alleged violation has been repeated) or
to be in violation of any condition of such permit. [emphasis added].
143. Compare 42 U.S.C. 7604(a) with CONF. REP. 952, supra note 142, at 297. Section
7604(a) has been amended by § 707(a) to read in pertinent part:
The district courts have jurisdiction, without regard to the amount in contro-
versy or the citizenship of the parties, to enforce such an emission standard or
limitation, or such an order, or to order the Administrator to perform such act
or duty, as the case may be, and to apply any appropriate civil penalties (except
for actions [against] Administrator to perform a mandatory duty).
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the authority to bring suit to compel Agency action that is unreasonably
delayed. 1  The fourth significant change allows any person to challenge
the Administrator's deferral of final actions.145 The last major change
was the creation of a penalty fund.146
A. Jurisdiction Over Past Violations
The new language allowing citizen suits for wholly past violations is a
compromise between the House and Senate versions of the 1990 law.147
It establishes a cause of action by a citizen plaintiff if the alleged polluter
has repeatedly violated the Act, despite the retrospective nature of the
violations. The statute now permits a citizen to bring suit:
(1) against any person.., who is alleged to have violated (if there is
evidence that the alleged violation has been repeated) or to be in viola-
tion of (A) an emission standard or limitation under this chapter or (B)
an order issued by the Administrator or a [s]tate with respect to such a
standard or limitation... [or] (3) against any person who.., is alleged
144. Compare 42 U.S.C. 7604(a) with CONF. REP. 952, supra note 142 at 298. The
following language was added to the end of paragraph (a) of § 7604 by § 707(f):
The district courts of the United States shall have jurisdiction to compel (con-
sistent with paragraph (2) of this subsection) agency action unreasonably
delayed except that an action to compel agency action referred to in section
307(b) which is unreasonably delayed may only be filed in a United States Dis-
trict Court within the circuit in which such action would be reviewable under
section 307(b). In any such action for unreasonable delay, notice to the entities
referred to in subsection (b)(1)(A) shall be provided 180 days before commenc-
ing such action.
145. Compare 42 U.S.C. 7607(b)(2) with CONF. REP. 952, supra note 137, at 299. The
following language was added to the end of § 7607(b)(2) by § 707(h): "Where a final
decision by the Administrator defers performance of any nondiscretionary statutory ac-
tion to a later time, any person may challenge the deferral pursuant to paragraph (1)."
146. CONF. REP. 952, supra note 142, § 707(g).
147. The House bill made no provision for a cause of action for wholly past violations.
The logical conclusion to draw from this omission is that the House did not intend to
change the holding in Gwaltney, which required an ongoing violation for a court to have
jurisdiction over a citizen suit. Gwaltney Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., 484 U.S. 49
(1987). See H.R. 3030, 101st Cong. 2d Sess. (1990). See also Midlantic Nat'l Bank v.
New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 474 U.S. 494, 501 (1986) ("[t]he normal rule of
statutory construction is that if Congress intends for legislation to change the interpreta-
tion of a judicially created concept, it makes that intent specific"). However, the Senate
bill did provide for citizen suits for wholly past violations. See S. 1630, 101st Cong. 2d
Sess. (1990). The Conference Committee Report adopts the Senate version which allows
for suits based on repetition of past violations. CONF. REP. 952, supra note 142, at 299.
The adoption of this version reflects the intent of Congress to resolve the jurisdictional
problems caused by the Gwaltney "ongoing violation" standard. See 136 CONG. REC.
E3695 (daily ed. Nov. 2, 1990) (Hon. Norman F. Lent of New York stated that "in the
enforcement section [of the citizen suit provisions] we [the Conference Committee] drew
primarily from the House language although we modified the citizen suit provision on
past violations to conform to the Supreme Court's Gwaltney decision); 136 CONG. REC.
S18,040 (daily ed. Oct. 24, 1990) (Mr. Baucus stated that "in response to the Supreme
Court ruling in Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., [cite omit-
ted] the conference agreement allows citizen suits to be brought with respect to past
violations if there is evidence that the violation has been repeated").
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to have violated (if there is evidence that the alleged violation has been
repeated) or to be in violation of any condition of [a] . . . permit. 148
The pre-1990 standard for jurisdiction over Clean Air Act violations
required a citizen to allege an ongoing or predictably intermittent viola-
tion. 149 The Supreme Court in Gwaltney v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation
resolved a three-way split among the circuits 50 by holding that the Clean
Air Act did not allow citizen suits unless the violation was ongoing.
Originally, the House version of the new law required only an allega-
tion of repeated or continuous past violations.'I' The Conference Com-
mittee, however, narrowed this language by requiring citizens to present
competent evidence' 5 2 of past violations that demonstrated a history of
infractions.
While the new Amendments allow citizens to sue for wholly past vio-
lations, the circumstances are limited. A citizen suit action based on
such violations is conditioned upon an evidentiary showing that: (1) the
148. The Conference Report explains further that § 707(g) has a delayed period of
effectiveness. This Amendment takes effect two years after the enactment of the Clean
Air Act Amendments of 1990. CONF. REP. 952, supra note 142, at 299.
149. See Gwaltney, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., 484 U.S. at 58-59. ("citizens...
unlike the Administrator, may seek . . . penalties ohly in a suit brought to enjoin or
otherwise abate an ongoing violation"). Gwaltney was a Clean Water Act case, but the
Court specifically applied the ongoing violation requirement to the Clean Air Act, by
stating that the "language of the citizen suit provisions of the two Acts is not accidental;
rather, the two provisions share the common central purpose of permitting citizens to
abate pollution when the government cannot or will not command compliance. This
understanding of the 'alleged to be in violation' language as a statutory term of art rather
than a mere stylistic infelicity is reinforced by the consistent adherence in the Senate and
House Reports to the precise statutory formulation." Id. at 62. See also Pawtexet Cove
Marina v. Ciba-Geigy, 807 F.2d 1089, 1094 (1st Cir. 1986) (citizen suit is proper if viola-
tions are intermittent but continuous).
150. 484 U.S. 49 (1987). Compare, Hamker v. Diamond Shamrock Chem. Co., 756
F.2d 392, 395 (5th Cir. 1985) (requiring that "a complaint brought under [§ 505] must
allege a violation occurring at the time the complaint is filed"); with Pawtexet Cove Ma-
rina v. Ciba-Geigy, 807 F.2d 1089, 1094 (1st Cir. 1986) (interpreting § 505 as requiring a
fair allegation by the citizen plaintiff of the "continuing likelihood that the defendant, if
not enjoined, will again proceed to violate the Act"), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 975 (1987);
[and] Chesapeake Bay Found. v. Gwaltney, Ltd., 791 F.2d 304, 309 (4th Cir. 1986) (per-
mitting citizen suits for wholly past violations), vacated 484 U.S. 49 (1987). The First
Circuit's interpretation precluded suits based on past violations only, but permitted suits
based on intermittent violations, even if there were no violations at the time the suit was
filed. The Fourth Circuit's opinion in Gwaltney stated that § 505 "can be read to compre-
hend unlawful conduct that occurred only prior to the filing of a lawsuit as well as unlaw-
ful conduct that continues into the present."
151. 136 CONG. REC. E3677 (daily ed. Nov. 2, 1990) (comments of Rep. Fields).
152. Neither Conference Committee report nor the legislative history of the 1990
Amendments explain "competent evidence." However, cases under older versions of the
Act discuss several types of evidence that have been found admissible to prove clean air
violations. Such evidence includes air samples and visible evidence. See Natural Re-
sources Defense Council v. Thomas, 845 F.2d 1088, 1090 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (discussion of
the types of sampling admissible to prove that a specific source has exceeded emission
limitations); Maine v. Thomas, 690 F. Supp. 1106, 1108 n.6 (D. Me. 1988) (discussion of
visible evidence which can be used as evidence in cases asserting violations of the Act),
afjrd, 874 F.2d 883 (1st Cir. 1989).
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past violations were frequent, (2) that the alleged violator habitually ig-
nored applicable requirements and (3) that the Agency did not ade-
quately enforce the law.' 53
The courts have generally held that the citizen plaintiff must first es-
tablish the frequency of past violations and that the defendant violated an
emissions standard or limitation under section 304(a) of the Act.'54 To
prove this violation, the plaintiff must allege in good faith that the de-
fendant violated the SIP. The allegation must include reasons for the
plaintiff's belief that the SIP was violated and the dates or periods on
which the violations occurred.155
Second, citizens must prove that the alleged violator habitually ig-
nored applicable requirements. 56 The legislative history does not define
what constitutes habitual disregard of the Act's requirements. The ac-
cepted definition of habitual is the "customary, usual, of the nature of
habit; frequent use or custom.' 57 It would seem, then, that the plaintiff
must assert that the alleged violator has exceeded emission standards as a
common practice.
Finally, the citizen plaintiff must allege that the Agency did not ade-
quately enforce the prohibition against these past violations and that
prosecution by a citizen is proper. The Administrator is deemed to have
inadequately enforced the Act, with respect to violations of emission
standards, if the penalty exacted is less stringent than normally required
by such a violation. A penalty insufficiently burdensome to prevent the
particular polluter from future breaches of the law also constitutes inade-
quate enforcement.158
B. Civil Penalties
The second significant area of change under the 1990 Amendments is
the award of civil penalties. The previous version of the Act merely pro-
vided for injunctive relief. 159 The new language of section 304(a) states
153. Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399 (1990).
154. 136 CONG. REC. S16,953 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990) (Clean Air Act Amendments of
1990, Chafee-Baucus Statement of Senate Managers).
155. Id.
156. See CONF. REP. 952, supra note 142, § 707(g).
157. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 640 (5th ed. 1983). Cases that define the word "ha-
bitual" often do so with reference to a specific statute. See Barbieri v. Morris, 315 S.W.2d
711, 713 (Mo. 1958) (a habitual violator of traffic laws is defined as one who has been
convicted of four moving violations within a two year period); but see McVey v. McVey,
119 N.J. Super. 4, 289 A.2d 549, 550 (Ch. Div. 1972) (habitual drunkenness is fixed,
frequent, irresistible, or a regular habit). For the purposes of the Act, it is best to take a
practical approach when determining whether a violator is a habitual offender since Con-
gress has chosen not to apply a quantitative definition at this time.
158. See Baughman v. Bradford Coal Co., 592 F.2d 215, 218-19 (3d Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 441 U.S. 961 (1979).
159. See Gwaltney, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., 484 U.S. 49, 62 (1987). "The
remedies available under the Act... for citizen suits provisions authorized by the Clean
Air Act ... are injunctive in nature." Id.
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that:
The district court shall have jurisdiction, without regard to the amount
in controversy or the citizenship of the parties, to enforce such an
emission standard or limitation, or such an order, or to order the Ad-
ministrator to perform such act or duty as the case may be, and to
apply any appropriate civil penalties.' 60
The Senate bill authorized the Administrator to "issue administrative
orders assessing civil penalties for violations of the SIP, of [federal clean-
air regulations] or whenever any person attempts to construct, modify, or
operate a major stationary source that is not in compliance with the new
source provisions of the Act."'' The Senate proposed a maximum pen-
alty of $25,000 per day for major violations. The Senate bill also con-
tained a proposal authorizing the Administrator to implement a field
citation program for minor violations of the Act that would have capped
the amount of such citations at $5,000 per inspection.1 62
The House adopted language that would allow the Administrator to
issue administrative orders assessing civil penalties for the same viola-
tions referred to in the Senate bill. The House amendment, like the Sen-
ate bill, adopted a field citation program and capped the field citation
penalties at $5,000 per day of violation. 63
The Conference Agreement adopted the Senate language authorizing
administrative orders assessing civil penalties up to $25,000 per day and
provided for "field citation" penalties up to $5,000 per day.'" Such or-
ders assessing appropriate penalties can be entered for past and present
violations of the SIP, as well as for violations of any requirement or pro-
hibition in the Act. This provision, allowing for courts to award civil
penalties when citizens step into the Administrator's shoes and prosecute
neglected violations, mirrors the penalties available to the EPA under the
Act. 165
The ability of the courts to order civil penalties will have an important
impact on future enforcement activities and on deterrence.' 66 It was the
design of the Conference Committee that citizens be allowed to seek civil
penalties against violators of the Act whenever two or more past viola-
160. CONF. REP. 952, supra note 142 at 297, § 707(a).
161. 136 CONG. REC. S16,951-52 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990).
162. Id. at S16,952.
163. Id.
164. See EESC Summary of Laws, Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. 101-
549 at 60.
165. See 135 CONG. REC. S15366-68 (daily ed. Nov. 9, 1989) (statements of Mr. Reid).
The Act allows the federal government, or a state, or a court to enforce the new provi-
sions by ordering civil penalties to be paid by a violator. The new provisions also allow
citizen suits to enforce the requirements of the new Act.
166. See Baughman v. Bradford Coal Co., 592 F.2d 215, 218 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
441 U.S. 961 (1979) (monetary sanctions as well as injunctive relief were seen by Con-
gress as necessary to deter future violations and ensure effective enforcement).
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tions occurred or for ongoing violations.167
The Act requires the Administrator and the courts to consider a
number of factors before arriving at an appropriate penalty, including the
economic benefit to the violator as a result of the violation. Congress
specifically sought to ensure that violators should not be able to obtain an
economic advantage over their competitors by violating environmental
laws. 168
The legislative history of the 1990 Amendments indicates that the de-
termination of economic benefit does not require an elaborate or burden-
some evidentiary showing and that reasonable approximations will
suffice. 169 Other factors customarily taken into account in assessing pen-
alties, such as the history of the violations, good faith efforts to comply
and the economic impact on the violator, may also be considered in ar-
riving at an appropriate fine. 17
0
C. Suits for Unreasonable Delay
The Amendments also provide for citizen suits for unreasonable delay,
which may be filed only in a district court within the circuit in which the
agency action would be reviewable under section 307(b). 171 The statute
allows a citizen plaintiff to file suit for unreasonable delay 180 days after
notification to the Administrator, the state and the alleged violator. 172
The original version of the House bill did not contain an explicit provi-
sion concerning unreasonable delay. The bill generally allowed citizens
to file unreasonable delay suits under the Administrative Procedure Act,
but did not grant citizens the right to file such suits under the provisions
of the Clean Air Act. 17
3
The Senate bill permitted citizen suits if the EPA unreasonably
delayed performance of a nondiscretionary duty.174  The Conference
Committee adopted the language of the Senate bill, which essentially
granted citizens the right to sue for unreasonable delay of a nondiscre-
tionary duty.175 However, the Conference Report specifically notes that
167. 136 CONG. REC. S16,953 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990) (Clean Air Act Amendments of
1990, Chafee-Baucus Statement of Senate Managers).
168. Id. at S16,952.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. See 136 CONG. REc. E3672 (daily ed. Nov. 2, 1990) (statement of Rep. Oxley).
172. See 136 CONG. REC. S16,953 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990) (Clean Air Act Amend-
ments of 1990, Chafee-Baucus Statement of Senate Managers). The six month waiting
period for unreasonable delay suits should apply only to newly authorized actions. Pre-
existing actions are not subject to this six month grace period.
173. H.R. 3030, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990).
174. S. 1630, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990).
175. Id. Citizens suits against the EPA can only be brought to compel performance of
a duty that is not discretionary. This limitation has been interpreted as restricting suits to
"actions seeking to enforce specific nondiscretionary clear-cut requirements" of the Act.
See Scott v. City of Hammond, 741 F.2d 992 (7th Cir. 1984) (per curiam), cert. denied,
469 U.S. 1196 (1985); Mountain States Legal Found. v. Costle, 630 F.2d 754 (10th Cir.
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the appellate courts should retain jurisdiction over the judicial review of
final agency actions.' 76 It appears that the Conferees did not intend to
weaken the existing case law, which holds that any EPA deferral of final
action is subject to challenge in the federal courts of appeal under section
307(b)(1). 77
The Conferees rejected the Senate definition of unreasonable delay of
six months or more.T'7  The failure of the House and Senate to agree on a
specific definition reflects the Conferee opinion that the EPA's conduct is
better addressed by the more flexible case-by-case approach inherent in
"unreasonable delay suits.' 1 79
The unreasonable delay provision authorizes the appropriate district
courts to enforce the provision of the Administrative Procedure Act that
requires an agency, "within a reasonable time," to "proceed to conclude
a matter presented to it."'8s It is designed to allow the courts to compel
the agency to respond to a petition for rulemaking, or other request for
agency action, if the agency has not responded within a reasonable time.
In deciding whether the EPA unreasonably delayed action, the courts
must weigh several factors before selecting a remedy. These factors in-
clude: (1) limitations on agency resources, (2) concomitant need to estab-
lish priorities, (3) the complexity of the Agency's task, and (4) the time
needed to allow for meaningful public participation in the Agency's
proceedings. I '
The 1990 Amendments do not alter the criteria that must be balanced
before a court can formulate an order compelling agency action. This
balancing also appears under the existing section 304(a)(2), in deadline
suits for claims in which the Administrator has failed to perform a non-
discretionary duty within the time limit provided by the relevant statute.
As in the deadline suits, the district courts in unreasonable delay cases
will have broad discretion to fashion schedules that require the EPA to
take action within a reasonable time.
D. Deferral of Agency Final Action
The 1990 Amendments also modify the provisions for judicial review
1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1050 (1981). See also City of Seabrook v. Costle, 659 F.2d
1371 (5th Cir. 1981); Anaconda Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 482 F.2d 1301 (10th Cir. 1973).
176. 136 CONG. REC. S16,953 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990).
177. Id. Section 307(b)(1) of the Clean Air Act governs judicial review of the Admin-
istrator's final actions, in contrast to § 7604 (a)(2), which governs actions to compel the
Administrator to perform a mandatory duty. The new law clearly differentiates between
deferral of a mandatory duty and deferral of a final action. See Solar Turbines, Inc. v.
Seif, 879 F.2d 1073, 1077-78 (3d Cir. 1989) (discussion on and examples of what consti-
tutes a final agency action).
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. § 555(b) (1982).
181. See 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1) (1988); see also 136 CONG. REC. E3673 (daily ed. Nov.
2, 1990) (statement of Rep. Oxley).
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of final agency actions in the appellate courts. Unlike the other citizen
suit provisions of the 1990 Amendments, this clause amends section
307(b)(2) of the Act, not section 304. The new paragraph provides:
"[w]here a final decision by the Administrator defers performance of any
nondiscretionary statutory action to a later time, any person may chal-
lenge the deferral pursuant to paragraph ().182
The deferral provision essentially mandates that any decision by the
Administrator to postpone a statutory or nondiscretionary duty will be
treated as if the Agency had made a final decision. This final decision is
then immediately appealable under section 307(b). This provision
counterbalances any inclination the Administrator might have to defer a
mandatory duty. In light of the broad availability of this remedy, it is
likely that when the statutory deadlines are approaching for rulemaking
on such matters as the regulation of air toxins, the Administrator's only
choices under the 1990 Amendments will be to grant or deny a petition
for rulemaking.
Existing case law addressing the issue of the Administrator's deferral
of a final action pursuant to section 307, treated such deferral as within
the discretion of the Agency. 8 3 The D.C. Circuit has held that a court
does not have jurisdiction to review an Administrator's deferral of
rulemaking. In Natural Resources Defense Council v. Thomas,184 the
plaintiff, who petitioned for judicial review of Agency delay, was admon-
ished by the circuit court, which explained that the case required a con-
clusive Agency decision to be justiciable.' 85  Under the 1990
Amendments, however, the Administrator's insulation from review in
these situations is eliminated. The decision to defer is considered a re-
viewable final action.
The distinction between the deferral clause, which amends section
307(b)(2), and the unreasonable delay language amending section 304 of
the 1990 Amendments, is important. Citizen plaintiffs suing under the
two sections vindicate different rights: section 304 plaintiffs seek enforce-
ment of the Clean Air Act statutes or EPA rules, while section 307 plain-
182. CONF. REP. 952, supra note 142, at 299. Section 7607(b) allows a citizen to peti-
tion for review of any action of the Administrator in the promulgation of a final decision.
Paragraph one divides the venue for judicial review between the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia if the decision is national in scope and the United
States Court of Appeals for the appropriate circuit if the decision has regional or local
effect. See 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1) (1988).
183. See Natural Resources Defense Council v. Thomas, 845 F.2d 1088, 1091-92 (D.C.
Cir. 1988) (agency deferral of final decision establishing proper methodology for imple-
mentation of NAAQS is not ripe for judicial review. A final decision by the Administra-
tor is essential for the review to be justiciable); Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. EPA, 782 F.2d
645, 654-55 (7th Cir. 1986) (court of appeals lacks the authority to order EPA to cease
deferral of rulemaking and take action within a certain time period). See generally Harri-
son v. PPG Indus., Inc., 446 U.S. 578 (1980) (discussion of "final actions" under 42
U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1) (1988)).
184. 845 F.2d 1088 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
185. Id. at 1091-92.
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tiffs challenge the validity of EPA rulings."16
Fundamentally, the unreasonable delay suits, should be used to
prompt the Agency to act when it has dragged its feet in performing a
statutory duty. If the court determines that the action has been delayed,
the court is empowered to impose a time schedule that must be adhered
to by the Agency.187
Once the Agency is ordered by the district court to act, the Adminis-
trator has three options: he can perform the nondiscretionary duty; he
can refuse to perform the nondiscretionary duty; or he may defer pro-
mulgation of a decision for any number of reasons. If the Administrator
performs the duty, this performance is a final action that may be re-
viewed under section 307(b)(1).' Should the Administrator decide not
to perform the obligation, the district court has the power to fashion any
remedy it sees fit 1 89 if it decides that Agency action is nonetheless man-
dated by the Act. If the Agency decides to defer the decision, it is treated
as a final action and is immediately eligible for judicial review in the
appropriate circuit court as outlined in section 307.
E. The Penalty Fund
The last major change in the 1990 citizen suit legislation is the creation
of a penalty fund. By drafting this innovative section, Congress ensured
that the EPA would have the necessary financing to enforce existing
clean air laws and the funds to improve and research antipollution
technology.
Section 304(g) reads in part:
(1) Penalties received... shall be deposited in a special fund in the
United States Treasury for licensing and other services. Amounts in
such fund are authorized to be appropriated and shall remain available
until expended for use by the Administrator to finance air compliance
and enforcement activities....
(2) Notwithstanding paragraph (1) the court in any action under this
subsection to apply civil penalties shall have discretion to order that
such civil penalties, in lieu of being deposited in the fund referred to in
paragraph (1), be used in beneficial mitigation projects which are con-
sistent with this Act and enhance the public health or the environment.
The court shall obtain the view of the Administrator in exercising such
discretion and selecting any such projects. The amount of any such
payment in any such action shall not exceed $100,000.
The first version of the House bill contained a brief provision address-
186. Note, Attorney's Fees and Ruckelshaus, 33 AM. U.L. REV. 775, 806 (1984).
187. 136 CONG. REC. E3673 (daily ed. Nov. 2, 1990) (statement of Rep. Oxley).
188. See 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1) (1988).
189. 136 CONG. REC. S16,953-55 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990) (Clean Air Act Amend-
ments of 1990, Chafee-Baucus Statement of Senate Managers).
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ing the penalty fund.' I The language used in later versions of the bill is
identical to the first paragraph of section 707(g), as adopted by the Con-
ference Committee. 191 The House proposals, however, did not contain
any reference to the court's ability to order the use of civil penalties to
fund environmental projects chosen at the court's discretion.
The initial Senate bill also contained a short section providing for a
penalty fund. This section, like the House versions, allowed the Admin-
istrator access to the funds deposited in the United States Treasury. 92
The discretionary allocation of these funds by the courts was not men-
tioned. Later versions of the Senate bill expand upon the language al-
lowing the Administrator to allocate funds for enforcement activities.
These versions of the bill grant courts the discretion to withhold penal-
ties from the Treasury funds and instead allocate those funds directly to
worthy environmental projects. 193
The Senate bill placed two important limits on a court invoking this
discretionary allocation power. First, the court must consult with the
Administrator in the selection of a worthy environmental project. 94
Second, the court can use this section to channel funds into worthy envi-
ronmental projects only up to the amount of $100,000.95
The Conference Report ultimately adopted the precise language
adopted in the final version of the Senate bill.196 By doing so, the Com-
mittee in effect permitted the Administrator and the courts to access
190. See H.R. 3030, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. § 610(b) (1989). This first version stated in
relevant part:
(b) Section 304 of the Clean Air Act is amended by adding the following new
subsection after subsection (f):
(g) PENALTY FUND. - Penalties recovered under subsection (a) shall be de-
posited in a special fund in the United States Treasury for licensing and other
services, which shall be available for appropriation, and remain available until
expended for use by the Administrator to finance air compliance and enforce-
ment activities.
191. See H.R. 3030, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. § 608(b) (1990) (version three of the House
Amendments to the Clean Air Act). The third version of this bill is almost identical to
§ 707(g)(1) as adopted by the Conference Committee.
192. See S. 1630, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. § 309(2) (1989). This initial provision stated in
pertinent part:
(2) Section 304 of the Clean Air Act is amended by adding the following new
subsection:
"(g) PENALTY FUND. - Penalties received under subsection (a) shall be de-
posited in a special fund in the United States Treasury for licensing and other
services, which shall be available for appropriation, and remain available until
expended for use by the Environmental Protection Agency to finance air com-
pliance and enforcement activities."
193. See S. 1630, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. § 707(b) (version seven of the Senate bill). This
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funds paid by violators of the Act as civil penalties. 'These funds may
now be efficiently utilized in enforcement and research activities.
The 1990 Amendments allow courts to withhold civil penalties from
the newly created penalty fund to use such funds in projects that advance
the objectives of the Clean Air Act. The court's allocation power over
these awards, however, is limited by the fact that the Administrator must
be consulted before the court exercises this option.197 In addition, the
maximum amount the court may award to a worthy project is
$100,000.198
F. Interstate Pollution
New avenues for citizen involvement, short of litigation, were charted
by Congress in the interstate pollution provisions of the 1990 Amend-
ments. The new provisions reflect the importance to Congress of wres-
tling with the interstate transport phenomenon.
1. Transport Commission Requests
The Interstate Transport Commissions are established by section
176A(b) of the Act. Among the required members are the governors of
each state in the region, or the designee of each governor, and an air
pollution control official representing each state in the region, appointed
by the governor. The role of the Transport Commission is to:
[a]ssess the degree of interstate transport of the pollutant or precursors
to the pollutant throughout the transport region, assess strategies for
mitigating the interstate pollution, and recommend to the Administra-
tor such measures as the Commission determines to be necessary to
insure that the plans for the relevant [s]tates meet the requirements of
section 1 OA(2)(D). 199
The Commission may also "request the Administrator to issue a find-
ing ... that the implementation plan for one or more of the [s]tates in the
transport region is substantially inadequate to meet the requirements of
section 110A(2)(d)." 2°  The Administrator must act on the request by
approving, disapproving or partially approving and partially disapprov-
ing it within eighteen months of its receipt. In acting on the request, the
Administrator must "provide an opportunity for public participation. 201
The effect of agency approval on a request is that the state implemen-
tation plan is revised to reflect the provisions of the request. The original
197. The language adopted by the Conference Report requires the court to obtain the
Administrator's view before exercising the option of funding environmental projects with
civil penalties. However, the court need not adhere to the Administrator's view. The
language also fails to describe the degree of deference the court must give the Administra-
tor's opinion.
198. Id.
199. CONF. REP. 952, supra note 142, § 176A(b)(2).
200. Id. § 176A(c).
201. Id.
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implementation plan, approved or promulgated by the Administrator
pursuant to the 1977 Amendments, remains in effect, except to the extent
that such a revision is approved by the Administrator pursuant to the
1990 Amendments.20 2
2. Notice of Permit Applications to Contiguous States
Procedures for review of permit applications also reflect Congress' rec-
ognition of the central significance of interstate air pollution transport.
The "permitting authority" must notify states: "A. Whose air quality
may be affected and that are contiguous to the [s]tate in which the emis-
sion originates, or B. That are within [fifty] miles of the source. '20 3
They must also provide an opportunity for such states to submit writ-
ten recommendations regarding the issuance of the permit and its terms
and conditions. If any part of those recommendations are not accepted
by the permitting authority, such authority must notify the state and the
Administrator "in writing of its failure to accept those recommendations
and the reasons therefor. ' 204
Presumably, a state that is contiguous to the source state or an area
within fifty miles of the source, will be responsive to political pressures
from its own citizens to articulate cogent and relevant "recommenda-
tions" to the permitting authority in the neighboring state. This type of
citizen involvement is only implicit in this provision and no specific pro-
cedures for gathering or responding to citizen initiatives in the neighbor-
ing state are provided in the Act.
The EPA's provisions for objection also provide an opportunity for
public involvement. The Administrator is obligated to object to issuance
of a permit if he determines that its provisions are not in compliance with
applicable requirements of the Act.205 Upon receipt of an objection by
the Administrator, the permitting authority may not issue the permit un-
less it is revised and issued in accordance with the objection.20 6 If the
Administrator fails to object in writing to issuance of a permit, pursuant
to section 505B(1), the rights of petition accrue to "any person. "207 In
situations where the Administrator was obligated to object to the permit
under the Act, but failed to do so, a citizen may bring suit directly
against the Administrator for failure to perform a nondiscretionary act.
These rights are exercisable within sixty days after expiration of the
forty-five day review period specified for the Administrator.20 8 The
202. See 136 CONG. REC. H13,101 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990).
203. CONF. REP. 952, supra note 142, § 505(a)(2). Congress contemplated this to
mean states with authority delegated from EPA.
204. Id.
205. Id. § 505(b)(1).
206. Id. § 505(b)(3).
207. Id. § 505(b)(2).
208. CONF. REP. 952, supra note 142, § 505(b)(2).
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available grounds for this petition are limited, however, and may be
based:
[o]nly on objections to the permit that were raised with reasonable
specificity during the public comment period provided by the permit-
ting agency (unless the petitioner demonstrates in the petition to the
Administrator that it was impracticable to raise such objections within
such a period or unless the grounds for such objection arose after such
period). 2"
Action by the Administrator after the petition has been filed must take
place within sixty days after the filing of a petition.
IV. THE 1990 AMENDMENTS: EFFECTS AND
PERSISTENT QUESTIONS
The 1990 Amendments remedy several of the shortcomings of the
1977 Amendments. The most important improvements are: (1) jurisdic-
tion over past violations, (2) the ability of courts to exact civil penalties
from polluters, (3) the option of allowing citizens to sue the EPA Admin-
istrator for unreasonable delay, (4) judicial review in the federal appellate
courts for review of final Agency actions, and (5) the ability of citizens in
one state to object to the issuance of a permit to emitting sources in an-
other state.
Despite these dramatic improvements in the citizen enforcement, the
1990 Act failed to resolve several important issues.
A. Jurisdiction
The extension of the jurisdiction of the federal courts to include citizen
allegations of wholly past violations 210 is a particularly significant advan-
tage to citizens who may now sue for repetitive past violations. The new
language changes the prospective nature of jurisdiction granted to the
district courts under the 1977 Amendments. It does not, however, re-
solve the related issue of what constitutes injury-in-fact under section
304.
The type and amount of injury a plaintiff must allege to fulfill the
standing requirements of a citizen plaintiff is still debatable. In Lujan v.
National Wildlife Federation, the Supreme Court held that there must be
some actual injury to the plaintiff.2" The narrow question Congress left
209. Id.
210. 136 CONG. REC. S16,953 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990) (The Clean Air Act Amend-
ments of 1990, Chafee-Baucus Statement of Senate Managers). The change in the lan-
guage of the citizen suit statute, allowing jurisdiction over wholly past violations, does
not take effect immediately. Instead, Congress postponed the effective date for the juris-
dictional change for two years. The Conference Committee Report states that "the
amendment made by this subsection [g] shall take effect with respect to actions brought
after the date [two] years after the enactment of the Clean Air Act Amendments of
1990." CONF. REP. 952, supra note 142, § 707(g).
211. See Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed., 110 S. Ct. 3177, 3186 (1990).
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open in the 1990 Amendments is, how serious must the injury be in order
to gain standing?
According to the normal rules of statutory construction, "if Congress
intends for legislation'to change the interpretation of a judicially created
concept, it makes that intent specific." 2" 2 Since Congress has decided to
leave the construction of injury-in-fact to the courts, citizen plaintiffs are
faced with an uncertain definition of this element of standing under sec-
tion 304.
B. Citizen Remedies
The 1990 Amendments broadened the relief available under the citizen
suit provisions to include civil penalties against a polluter,213 but they do
not change the law with respect to compensatory damages. Section 304
does not grant the court the ability to award a plaintiff damages. Osten-
sibly, citizens injured by the defendant's actions will have little incentive
to expend the time and energy to prosecute infractions if they are not
compensated for damages.
Compensatory damages provide the courts with a powerful tool to
help promote deterrence 21 4 and make the plaintiff whole by redressing
any injuries caused to him by the defendant's wrongs. The injuries are
particularly egregious under section 304 because the Administrator es-
sentially forced the citizen plaintiff to take its place in prosecuting
offenses.215
The legislative history of the 1970 Act clearly indicated that damages
for injury to person or property should not be recoverable under citizen
suit provisions.2" 6 Consequently, compensatory damages have been de-
nied consistently to citizen plaintiffs, particularly environmental organi-
zations that seek damages on behalf of their members.217
However, in Delaware Citizens for Clean Air, Inc. v. Stauffer Chemical
Co., the Delaware District Court, which denied an environmental organi-
zation compensatory damages on behalf of its members, stated that a
right to compensatory damages could be properly invoked by an individ-
ual citizen plaintiff. The opinion assumes that "there is a private right to
damages under the citizens suit section of the Act, . . . and that such a
right could be properly invoked by an injured party on the facts of this
212. Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 474 U.S. 494, 501
(1986).
213. See CONF. REP. 952, supra note 142, § 707(a).
214. Cf. Baughman v. Bradford Coal Co., 592 F.2d 215, 218 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 441
U.S. 961 (1979) (Congress views monetary sanctions, as well as injunctive relief, as neces-
sary to ensure effective enforcement and deter future violations).
215. Cf id. (Congress intended citizen suits as an alternate enforcement mechanism
when the Administrator fails to enforce the mandates of the Act).
216. S. REP. No. 1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 38 (1970) (comments of Comm. of Public
Works).
217. Delaware Citizens for Clean Air, Inc. v. Stauffer Chem. Co., 367 F. Supp. 1040,
1047 (D. Del. 1973), aff'd, 510 F.2d 969 (3d Cir. 1975).
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case." 218
Since one of the principal objectives of the Act's providing citizens
with greater incentives to perform their supervisory role is the enforce-
ment of the Clean Air Act, the 1990 Amendments should have provided
for compensatory damages.
C. Attorney's Fees
The language of section 304(e) remains unchanged in the 1990
Amendments. Attorney's fees may still be awarded to either party at the
discretion of the court. The 1990 Amendments permit citizens to seek
review of EPA-promulgated air quality and emissions standards and to
recover the costs of this litigation. The fact that Congress did not change
any of the language of this provision in 1990, leads to the conclusion that
Congress is aware of the Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club "partially successful
plaintiff" standard, and continues to find this standard acceptable.21 9
Alternatively, the absence of consensus on a change in the 1990 Amend-
ments indicates merely that no political agreement was reached to alter
the rule as interpreted in Ruckelshaus.
Few courts have addressed the issue of whether a citizen plaintiff may
collect attorney's fees for initiating prosecution of a violation of the Act
which is settled before trial.22  However, some courts have decided that
plaintiffs who settle a case before trial should be awarded fees. These
cases base the award of fees on the rationale that the attempted prosecu-
tion of violations advances the goals of the Act.
In Pennsylvania v. Delaware Citizen's Council,22 1 the Supreme Court
granted certiorari to decide whether section 304(d) authorizes the recov-
218. Id. Judge Stapleton also implied in his opinion that if the environmental organi-
zation had brought this case as a class action, the individual members might have recov-
ered damages.
219. 463 U.S. 680 (1983). It is important to understand that Congress specifically ad-
dressed the prospective language problem presented by the Gwaltney decision. It is evi-
dence that Congress is aware of these standard setting Supreme Court cases and will
change the standard where it finds the Court's interpretation does not comply with the
congressional intent in passing the statute.
220. See Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council, 478 U.S. 546, 559-60
(1986)(plaintiffs entitled to recover attorney's fees for time spent monitoring state compli-
ance with consent decree). See Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA, 484 F.2d
1331, 1338 (1st Cir. 1973) (petitioners entitled to award of attorney's fees where settle-
ment order required EPA to comply with certain requirements of the Clean Air Act);
McCann v. Coughlin, 698 F.2d 112, 128 (2d Cir. 1983) (a favorable settlement is suffi-
cient by itself to support an award of attorney's fees without any adjudication or admis-
sion of liability). See also Davenport v. St. Mary's Hosp., No. 84-4549, 1988 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 1332 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 23, 1988) (citing attorney's fees provisions of Clean Air Act),
the court in this case held that the plaintiff may recover the attorney's fees necessary to
enforce the terms of a settlement agreement. Cf, Note, Awards of Attorneys' Fees to
Nonprevailing Parties Under the Clean Air Act: Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 59 WASH. L.
REV. 585, 587 (nonprevailing plaintiffs, as well as intervenors or plaintiffs, who settle can
be awarded fees under the broad discretion granted to the courts in § 304(e) language
"whenever appropriate").
221. 478 U.S. 546 (1986).
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ery of attorney's fees for time spent by plaintiff's counsel participating in
regulatory proceedings after the case was settled by a consent decree. 222
The case was the result of a complaint filed by the citizen's organization
and the United States to compel Pennsylvania to implement a vehicle
emission inspection and maintenance program as required by the Clean
Air Act.22 a
The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania agreed to establish such pro-
grams and a consent decree was approved in 1978. The programs did
not proceed smoothly in the years that followed, and in 1981, the parties
were again before the district court. The court at this time ruled that
Pennsylvania was in violation of the Act for failing to implement vehicle
emission inspection and maintenance programs as mandated by the Act
and the 1978 consent decree.224
The plaintiff, Delaware Valley Citizen's Council, sought attorney's fees
and costs for their work, which was performed after issuance of the con-
sent decree in 1978.22' The district court awarded Delaware Valley sub-
stantial fees.2 26 Pennsylvania objected to the payment of these fees
because they were primarily incurred as a result of plaintiff's counsel
attending post-decree regulatory proceedings and were not the direct
"costs" of litigation.2 27 The district court rejected this contention. It
found that because the proposed regulations would have affected Dela-
ware Valley's rights under the consent decree, the group had a unique
interest in the proceedings that made its work sufficiently related to the
litigation to be compensable.228
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the fee award229
and the State of Pennsylvania appealed to the Supreme Court, which
granted certiorari. The Supreme Court held that the fee award was ap-
propriate for time spent monitoring state compliance with the consent
decree. The Court's opinion urged lower courts to "recognize that in
bringing legitimate actions under [section 304(d)] citizens would be per-
forming a public service and in such instances the courts should award
the costs of litigation to such party. ' 230 The Court also stated that there
was no reason to interpret section 304 as "requiring that work done by
222. Id. at 548.
223. Id. at 549.
224. Id. at 549-52.
225. The original 1978 agreement contained a provision that required Pennsylvania to
pay $30,000 in attorney's fees to Delaware Valley for attorney's fees and costs incurred
prior to the entry of the consent decree. Id. at 549.
226. See Delaware Valley Citizens' Council v. Pennsylvania, 581 F. Supp. 1412, 1433
(E.D. Pa. 1984), aff'd, 762 F.2d 272 (3d Cir. 1985), a2fd in part rev'd in part, 478 U.S.
546 (1986).
227. Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council, 478 U.S. 546, 558 (1986).
228. Id. at 558-61.
229. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council v. Pennsylvania, 762 F.2d 272, 274 (3d Cir.
1985), affid in part rev'd in part, 478 U.S. 546 (1986).
230. Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council, 478 U.S. at 560 (citing with
approval S. REP. No. 1196, 91st Cong., 2nd Sess., at 36 (1970)).
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counsel be in the context of traditional judicial litigation, [for] section
304 does not preclude an award of reasonable attorney's fees for work
done after the consent decree.
2 3 1
Although the Delaware Valley opinion addresses the issue of an award
of attorney's fees after a settlement is reached, the language used in Dela-
ware Valley by the Supreme Court is broad enough to encompass fees
incurred before settlement where the actions of the citizen are a public
service and the claim is legitimate.232
In Friends of the Earth v. Eastman Kodak Co. ,233 citizens sued Kodak
for violations of the Clean Water Act. The parties agreed to settle the
action and they incorporated their agreement in a consent decree. Under
the decree each party reserved the right to assert a claim for costs of
litigation, including reasonable attorney's fees.23 4
The plaintiff later applied for an award of attorney's fees which the
district court allowed. However, the parties could not agree on the
proper amount to be awarded and ultimately appealed on this issue.235
The Second Circuit held that the district court's interpretation that the
plaintiff had achieved "some success" in light of the favorable consent
decree was correct and that "an award was appropriate. ' 236 However,
the court stated that "[s]ince there was no trial and the recovery was
minimal... [the fee should be small].1 237 Therefore, the Second Circuit
found that a trial on the merits, as well as prevailing party status, are
important elements in determining the appropriateness of the size of a fee
award.2 38
Other courts have found that a trial on the merits and prevailing party
status are not only important in determining the amount of fees to be
awarded, but essential as to whether fees should be awarded at all.
In United States v. Hooker Chemicals & Plastics Corp. ,239 the district
court denied citizen intervenors attorney's fees for their participation in a
Clean Water Act case. The plaintiffs claimed that they were "partially
successful" because the settlement agreement was modified to include
conditions advantageous to their interests. The plaintiffs also took the
position that these conditions would not have been included in the settle-
ment if they had not intervened. 2 ° The district court rejected the plain-
231. Id.
232. Id. This conclusion does not interfere with the holding in Ruckelshaus v. Sierra
as long as the plaintiff prevails on some issues in the settlement.
233. 834 F.2d 295 (2d Cir. 1987).
234. Id. at 296-97.
235. See id. at 297 (lodestar figure is the award of reasonable hours multiplied by a
reasonable hourly fee increased or decreased by facts the court finds relevant).
236. Id.
237. Friends of the Earth v. Eastman Kodak Co., 834 F.2d 295.
238. Id. at 298.
239. 591 F. Supp. 966 (W.D.N.Y. 1984).
240. Id. at 968.
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tiff intervenors motion for fees.24' The court found that litigants who
achieve no success on the merits cannot be awarded attorney's fees and
that "purely procedural victories" cannot be considered justification for
such awards. Therefore, the court in Hooker required a plaintiff to pre-
vail on substantive issues before any fees may be granted.242
The award of attorney's fees is particularly important if the citizen
plaintiff, as in Hooker intervenes in an action being diligently prosecuted
by the Administrator. The language of the citizen suit provisions allows
the citizen plaintiff to intervene as a matter of right.243 The reward of
attorney's fees for the performance of this supervisory function, however,
may not be available to them. 2 "
In United States v. National Steel Corp. ,245 the Sixth Circuit held that
section 304(d) does not authorize an award of attorney's fees to persons
who intervene in enforcement actions brought and diligently prosecuted
by the United States.246 The court in National Steel stated that when "an
intervenor's action is brought pursuant to section 304(a)... attorney fees
are available ... under section 304(d) of the Act only in cases in which
the Administrator or [s]tate is not diligently prosecuting the action. '247
This preference for awarding fees to citizens who initiate an action but
withholding a fee award to citizens who intervene in an existing action is
illogical. The identity of the party who initially files the action should
not be the decisive factor in determining whether the actions of the citi-
zen plaintiff promote the objectives of the Clean Air Act. It is the allega-
tions contained in the complaint, as well as the remedies requested, that
define the correlation between citizen action and the advancement of the
goals of the Act. Citizen plaintiffs may allege different facts or request
different remedies than the Administrator. These differences may result
in a prosecution of the defendant that is far more effective due to citizen
intervention.
Courts should encourage citizen plaintiffs to perform supervisory func-
tions by awarding fees in either the settlement or intervention scenarios.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (1988). The citizen intervenors in Hooker Chemicals were de-
nied attorney's fees for reasons other than their status as intervenors. The court in
Hooker Chemicals specifically did not address the issue of whether only the original plain-
tiffs in an action under section 304(a) may recover fees. United States v. Hooker Chems.
& Plastics Corp., 591 F. Supp. 966, 971 (W.D.N.Y. 1984).
244. Compare United States v. National Steel Corp., 782 F.2d 62, (6th Cir. 1986) (no
fee award under § 304(d) for persons who intervene in enforcement actions being dili-
gently prosecuted by the Administrator), with Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 (1983)
(where plaintiffs prevail in attaining their objectives, which would not have occurred
without their efforts, fees are appropriate without analysis of individual motions and liti-
gated claims). Cf. Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council, 478 U.S. 546
(1986) (attorney's fees are appropriate where organization's participation in administra-
tive proceedings is crucial to the vindication of the group's rights under a consent decree).
245. 782 F.2d 62 (6th Cir. 1986).
246. Id. at 64.
247. Id.
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Although the citizen does not act as a private attorney general in inter-
vention situations, no language in the Act requires fees to be awarded
only for fulfillment of this role. Instead, courts should examine the citi-
zen's contribution to the overall effectiveness of the case in order to de-
termine if the situation is appropriate for fees to be awarded.
D. Citizen Suits for Unreasonable Delay and Deferral
The 1990 Amendments to the Act provide citizens with a means to
prosecute unreasonable Agency delay or deferral of mandatory duties
pursuant to section 304(a)248 or section 307.249
1. Unreasonable Delay
The district court has jurisdiction to order the Agency to perform a
nondiscretionary duty after it determines that the Agency's procrastina-
tion is unreasonable. The 1990 Amendments, however, do not specify
what constitutes "unreasonable" delay for the purposes of a citizen suit.
Pre-existing case law is relevant in determining what constitutes unrea-
sonable delay in a citizen suit. The case law, consistent with the legisla-
tive history of the 1990 Amendments,250 illustrates that the unreasonable
delay provisions are similar to deadline suits where the Administrator
has a statutory duty which must be performed within the deadline set
forth by the statute.
The existing case law concerning unreasonably delayed Agency action
is convoluted. It is important to note that in pre-1990 cases, unreasona-
ble delay is not clearly distinguished from deferral of final Agency action
even though this distinction is critical in determining whether the district
or appellate courts have jurisdiction. Therefore, these cases should be
used cautiously as precedent for interpreting the 1990 provisions which
sought separate remedies for unreasonable delay suits as opposed to
deferral suits.
As an example of such pre-existing case law, in Environmental Defense
Fund v. Thomas,25' environmental organizations and several states252
brought an action to compel the Administrator to promulgate revised
National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) for sulphur ox-
ides.253 The plaintiffs alleged that section 109(d) of the Act required the
Administrator to publish standards by a specific statutory deadline.254
248. CONF. REP. 952, supra note 142 at 298.
249. CONF. REP. 952, supra note 142 at 299.
250. 136 CONG. REC. S16,953 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990).
251. 870 F.2d 892 (2d Cir. 1989).
252. Id. The states involved in this case were New York, Connecticut, New Hamp-
shire, Massachusetts, Vermont, Minnesota and Rhode Island.
253. Id. at 894.
254. The Clean Air Act provided at the time of this case: "[n]ot later than December
31, 1980, and at five-year intervals thereafter, the Administrator shall complete a thor-
ough review of the criteria published under [s]ection 7408 ... and promulgate such new
standards as may be appropriate .... The Administrator may review and reverse criteria
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The plaintiffs further argued that the Administrator had a nondiscretion-
ary duty to revise the NAAQS.
The district court disagreed with the plaintiffs and instead held that
the Administrator had discretion not to revise the standards if he so
chose. The court concluded that because the duty to revise the NAAQS
was discretionary, the district court lacked jurisdiction over the dispute
to compel the agency to perform the delayed revisions. 255 The plaintiffs
appealed the decision. The EPA argued that declining to publish a
sulphur oxide standard was not reviewable by an appellate court under
section 307 because it involved no decision or other Agency "action."256
The Second Circuit disagreed with both parties. The circuit found
that the Agency had a duty to make some decision under section 109(d)
and that its performance with regard to this mandatory decision is re-
viewable under section 307. Also, the court held that because the duty to
make some decision is nondiscretionary, it is enforceable under section
304 in the district court.25
7
The Second Circuit in Thomas struggled with the issue of which court
had jurisdiction over this case. The District of Columbia Court of Ap-
peals had claimed jurisdiction over these unreasonable delay cases on the
grounds that the Administrative Procedure Act dictates that the circuit
courts are the sole forum for review of agency inaction.25' The District
of Columbia Court of Appeals had further ruled that, in contrast, when
there is no deadline in the Clean Air Act, but a deadline is merely in-
ferred from the overall statutory scheme, a claim alleging unreasonable
delay is properly within the jurisdiction of the appropriate circuit
court.2 5 9
Ultimately, the Second Circuit held that a district court has jurisdic-
tion to compel the Administrator to take some formal action for the revi-
sion of NAAQS because this duty is nondiscretionary. The opinion also
concluded that when EPA action is unreasonably delayed, the district
courts have exclusive jurisdiction to compel Agency action. 26
or promulgate new standards earlier or more frequently than required under this para-
graph." 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (1988).
255. Environmental Defense Fund v. Thomas, 870 F.2d 892, 894-95 (2d Cir. 1989),
cert. denied, 493 U.S. 991 (1989).
256. Id. at 896.
257. Id.
258. Id. at 897; seeSierra Club v. Thomas, 828 F.2d 783 (D.C. Cir. 1987). The D.C.
Circuit claimed jurisdiction over the case under the APA as well as § 307(b) of the Clean
Air Act. Section 307(b) of the Act requires that final review of Agency national decisions
is appropriate only in the D.C. Circuit, whereas actions for final review of Agency deci-
sions that are local in nature should be filed in the circuit court with jurisdiction over the
parties or issue. See 42 U.S.C. § 2707(b) (1988).
259. Sierra Club v. Thomas, 828 F.2d 783, 792-93 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
260. Environmental Defense Fund v. Thomas, 870 F.2d 892, 898-900 (2d Cir. 1989),
cert. denied, 493 U.S. 991 (1989). Judge Mahoney wrote a dissent that would have up-
held the district court's determination that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction. How-
ever, even the dissenting opinion would have allowed the district court jurisdiction over
unreasonable delay suits. Judge Mahoney's opinion noted with approval that if, "[t]he
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The Conferees who drafted the 1990 Amendments apparently agreed
with the Second Circuit's holding in Environmental Defense Fund v.
Thomas. The Committee granted unreasonable delay jurisdiction to the
district courts in the new Amendments. Also, the Committee specifically
rejected establishing a time frame for EPA response to citizen petitions,
and instead decided that this is better addressed in the district courts by
the more flexible case-by-case determination of what constitutes unrea-
sonable delay.26'
Pursuant to this revision of section 304(a), the citizen plaintiff need not
seek appellate review of an agency's decision to delay prosecution of a
violation or the performance of any other nondiscretionary duty. In-
stead, the right to sue in a district court for unreasonable delay is granted
under section 304.262 Therefore, the confusion as to jurisdiction over a
citizen suit for delay or deferral is made less ambiguous in the 1990
Amendments by the distinction drawn between district and appellate ju-
risdiction. The critical question in deciding jurisdiction for delay or
deferral is whether the suit is for deferral of a final action under section
307, or delay of a nondiscretionary duty under section 304.
2. Deferral of Final Action
The new Amendments also revise section 307 to permit citizens to
bring suit against the EPA for deferred final actions.26 3 This section is
aimed at resolving the conflict among the courts interpreting whether the
Administrator can defer performance of a mandatory duty.
The First Circuit case, Maine v. Thomas,2"4 upheld a lower court's
determination that once the EPA has publicly announced a formal deci-
sion to defer action, such deferral is treated as a final action for the pur-
pose of review under the Act.265 The court stated that the decision to
defer in this case "constituted a fully developed part of the final
action.
266
Administrator'sfailure to respond [to a petition for rulemaking] ... may be appeal[ed in]
the [d]istrict [c]ourt under the [Administrative Procedure Act] . . . . [T]he [d]istrict
[c]ourt would have the power to demand the Administrator issue a response ... ." Id. at
901, quoting Oljato Chapter of Navajo Tribe v. Train, 515 F.2d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
261. S. 1630, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. § 707 (1990). The Senate bill, S. 1630, contained
language that established a specific time which constituted unreasonable delay. Congress
rejected this approach for the more flexible, court-determined method, which requires a
balancing of several factors to determine whether the Agency has acted in an unreasona-
ble manner. 136 CONG. REC. S16,953 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990) (Chafee-Baucus State-
ment of Senate Managers).
262. 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (1988).
263. 42 U.S.C. § 7607 (1988).
264. 874 F.2d 883 (1st Cir. 1989).
265. See id. at 891; Maine v. Thomas, 690 F. Supp. 1106, 1110-12 (D. Me. 1988), affid,
874 F.2d 883 (1st Cir. 1989); see also Environmental Defense Fund v. Costle, 448 F.
Supp. 89, 92 (D.D.C. 1978) (deferral of final action reviewable only in the appropriate
court of appeals).
266. Maine v. Thomas, 874 F.2d 883, 887 (1st Cir. 1989).
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In Thomas, several states and environmental groups brought an action
for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief requesting the court to
compel the EPA to promulgate additional air pollution regulations for
protection of visibility in federal parks and wilderness areas. The United
States District Court for the District of Maine granted the EPA's motion
to dismiss and the citizen plaintiffs appealed.
267
The EPA argued in Thomas that the deferred action should not be
reviewable in either the district or appellate courts, and that Congress
did not intend for "persons confronted by a governmental promise of
some future action to rush headlong" into court.26 8 However, the First
Circuit rejected the EPA's reasoning and held that the citizen plaintiff
has an immediate cause of action, under section 307, if the Administrator
defers the performance of a nondiscretionary duty.
In 1990, Congress followed the reasoning of Maine v. Thomas and
drafted the deferral language of the new Amendments with reference to,
and in compliance with, the holding in this case.26 9 Congress specifically
expressed that the deferral provision provides citizens with a cause of
action when confronted with a Thomas situation.270 Congress provided
that any Agency decision to defer a nondiscretionary duty may be
treated as a final action under section 307(b)(1). 2 7 1
Therefore, the 1990 Act provides that where the EPA defers taking
final action with regard to one of these obligations, this deferral will be
treated as if it were a final decision and may be challenged in the appro-
priate federal appellate court.
The confusing history of unreasonable delay and deferral suits man-
dates caution when proceeding with these types of suits. Plaintiffs may
only bring these actions to compel or review nondiscretionary duties.
Thus, the difficult issue of whether a duty is mandatory must also be
resolved. The absence of a definition of unreasonable delay adds to the
complex nature of unreasonable delay suits, and warrants caution in in-
terpreting existing case law.
E. Interstate Pollution
The 1990 Amendments establish a system of regional coordination
new to clean air enforcement. This system attempts to forge an interstate
approach to air quality maintenance through mandatory participation in
the Interstate Transport Commission program.272 Also, the new legisla-
tion requires that a source state must give a contiguous or proximate
state notice and the opportunity to object to an application for a permit
267. Id. at 883.
268. Id. at 889.
269. 136 CONG. REC. S16,953 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990).
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. CONF. REP. 952, supra note 142, § 176A(c), at 23.
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for a proposed emitting source.273
The Interstate Transport Commission provisions now require compul-
sory participation in regional air pollution control programs and recom-
mendations for strategies for mitigation of interstate pollution if a
participating state's SIP is found to be inadequate.274 Under this scheme,
states affected by regional pollution can force an offending state to amend
its SIP if the plan is unacceptable to a majority of the states on the Com-
mission. If a SIP is found to be inadequate, the Administrator is re-
quired to accept the Commission's recommendation for revision of the
offending SIP or the Administrator must ensure the deficiency will be
corrected within eighteen months through an alternate plan.2 75
Congress intentionally structured the 1990 Amendments in a manner
that makes it difficult for federal regulators, or offending states, to block
the air pollution standards adopted by a majority of states in the re-
gion.2 76 The Administrator must either approve the Commission's ac-
tion or develop a different pollution control approach that obtains the
same result.277
Citizens are also given a new procedure to protest emissions from out-
of-state sources under the 1990 Amendments. Any state which receives
an application for a permit from a major emitting source must give notice
of this application to contiguous and proximate states. The Amendments
provide for citizen participation in affected states by requiring a public
comment period. If the Administrator does not object to the issuance of
an out-of-state permit that would violate the Act, the Administrator's
right to object is granted to any citizen. However, this right to object to
offending permits does not provide the citizen with direct means to pro-
hibit the issuance of the permit. If the source state ultimately determines
that the permit is valid, the objections of citizens may be overruled with-
out repercussions to the source state. Therefore, citizen participation in
the issuance of out-of-state permits is limited to recommendations that
are accepted by the source state's officials.278
F. Statute of Limitations
The 1990 Amendments do not state the applicable statute of limita-
tions for a citizen suit under section 304. Instead the plaintiff who files
an action under this section must determine how long the statute of limi-
tations is under the local rules of the appropriate district court.
In the case of Student Public Interest Research Group (SPIRG) v.
273. Id. § 505(a)(2), at 257.
274. Id. § 176A(c), at 23.
275. Id. § 179(a), at 24.
276. 136 CONG. REC. S16,953 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990).
277. See CONF. REP. 952, supra note 142, § 179(a), at 24; N.Y. Times, May 7, 1991,
§ 2, at 1.
278. See CONF. REP. 952, supra note 142, § 505(a)(2), at 257.
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AT&T Laboratories (Bell Labs),279 the federal district court in New
Jersey addressed the issue of whether a citizen suit was time-barred
under the Clean Water Act by the applicable state two year statute of
limitations. The citizen plaintiffs in this case sought an adjudication that
AT&T had violated specific permit regulations between 1977 and 1982.
AT&T argued that because seventy of the eighty violations had occurred
outside the applicable state statute of limitations the bulk of the claims
were time-barred.28 °
The district court rejected the defendant's statute of limitations argu-
ment. The court held that "no state statute of limitations applies to citi-
zen suit actions under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act. '281 The
court reasoned that if the EPA had brought the suit, no state statute of
limitations would apply. Therefore, because "Congress sought to pro-
mote regulatory uniformity by providing identical enforcement mecha-
nisms for citizen and governmental suits," no state statute of limitations
should time-bar a citizen suit.
2 82
The district court also refused to apply the state statute of limitations
because applying it would have provided incentive for states to favor
business through environmental regulation. The court found that Con-
gress specifically wanted a national policy of enforcement of federal envi-
ronmental statutes, and that allowing states to adopt varying statutes of
limitations would encourage some states to be more lenient in prosecut-
ing violations.283 This would allow some states to become havens for
industrial polluters.284 Therefore, the New Jersey District Court held
that there is no statute of limitations on a citizen suit under section 304.
Conversely, in the case of Chesapeake Bay Foundation v. Bethlehem
Steel Corp.,285 which was decided on similar facts and in the same year as
SPIRG v. Bell Labs, a federal district court in Maryland held that a fed-
eral five year statute of limitations was applicable to all citizen suits
under the Clean Water Act.2 86
The court in this case agreed with the SPIRG v. Bell Labs reasoning
that Congress did not intend federal courts to borrow state statutes for
purposes of the Clean Water Act. The court in Chesapeake v. Bethlehem
Steel also cautioned against allowing states to adopt varying statutes of
limitations for the purposes of hospitality toward industries that violate
the Act.287
The Chesapeake court also advocated the uniform application of stat-
279. 617 F. Supp. 1190 (D.N.J. 1985).
280. Id. at 1202-03.
281. Id. at 1202.
282. Id.
283. Student Public Interest Research Group (SPIRG) v. AT&T (Bell Labs), 617 F.
Supp. 1190, 1202-06 (D.N.J. 1985).
284. Id.
285. 608 F. Supp. 440 (D.C. Md. 1985).
286. Id.
287. Id. at 447.
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utes of limitations to government as well as citizen suits. The court held
that the federal statute of limitations for government actions28 was "al-
most certainly" applied to Clean Water Act cases. The court stated that
"[a]lthough there is no precedent for applying the statute of limitations
applicable to government actions for civil penalties to a citizen suit
[under the Act], this is the most appropriate statute... to be applied in
this action. 28 9
These cases illustrate the conflicting statutes of limitations applied to
citizen suits. The 1990 Amendments did not address this conflict, nor
does the legislative history provide any guidelines. Therefore, citizens
bringing suit under the Clean Air Act must consider the applicable state
statute of limitations to ensure their action is not time-barred.
CONCLUSION
The citizen suit provisions of the Clean Air Act are designed as fail-
safe mechanisms in the overall enforcement structure of the Act. These
mechanisms are triggered whenever the Administrator is negligent in
performing any mandatory enforcement or rulemaking obligation as re-
quired by the Act.
Despite the optimistic legislative intent behind the citizen suit legisla-
tion, inherent flaws interfered with its functioning. The 1990 Amend-
ments to the Clean Air Act sought to ensure that citizens could fully
enforce the Act if the Administrator failed to do so.
Congress aggressively attacked the pre-existing problems in the citizen
suit provision in the language of the 1990 Amendments. Citizens now
have additional power to bring suits under the Act, even if the violations
are purely retrospective. Also, citizens now have a definite cause of ac-
tion where the EPA has unreasonably delayed performing a nondiscre-
tionary action or deferred a final decision. The new Amendments
changed the remedies available in citizen suits to include civil penalties
and provide for a fund made up of these penalties to be used in the fi-
nancing of enforcement actions and worthy environmental projects.
Despite potentially far-reaching changes, the new Amendments leave
several issues outstanding. First, the jurisdictional provisions do not re-
solve the question of what constitutes injury-in-fact for the purposes of
gaining standing as a citizen plaintiff. Second, the attorney's fees section
288. 28 U.S.C. § 2462 states in pertinent part:
Except as otherwise provided by Act of Congress, an action, suit or proceeding
for the enforcement of any civil fine, penalty or forfeiture, pecuniary or other-
wise, shall not be entertained unless commenced within five years from the date
when the claim first accrued if, within the same period, the offender or the
property is found within the United States in order that proper service may be
made thereon.
Id. at 449 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2462 (1982)).
289. Chesapeake Bay Found. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 608 F. Supp. 440, 448-49 (D.
Md. 1988).
1991]
124 FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REPORT [Vol.1I
of the citizen suit provisions do not address the "partially prevailing
party" standard with regard to settlement of claims and intervention.
Third, the new provisions do not define unreasonable delay in Agency
action. Last, the Amendments do not designate an applicable statute of
limitations.
These shortcomings reduce the effectiveness of an otherwise tremen-
dously useful and effective statute. Therefore, we advocate that Congress
address the four major drawbacks noted above, so that citizens may ful-
fill the supervisory role assigned to them under the Clean Air Act.
